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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
TROY MICHAEL KELL, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
V. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
Appellate No. 20070234 
Trial No. 030600171 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) and Ut. R. App. P. 3(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
ISSUE #1: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing claims 8, 9, 10, 11, 13(a), 
14 and 15(b) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-106(2) on its determination that those 
claims were previously raised and rejected on direct appeal. RECORD CITATION: This 
issue was raised below in Kell's Memorandum in Support of Objection to State's Motion to 
Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "This court 
generally reviews interpretations of rules for correctness...." State ex. rel. S.M., 154 P.3d 
835 (Utah 2007), citing In re Fox, 89 P.3d 127 (Utah 2004). 
This Court has stated that, "[t]he grant or denial of a motion to dismiss is a question 
of law [that] we review for correctness, giving no deference to the decision of the trial court." 
State v. Hamilton, 70 P.3d 111 (Utah 2003) (quotations and citation omitted). The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law that this Court reviews for correctness. 
Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 935 P.2d 518, 519 (Utah 1997). 
ISSUE #2: Whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on 
claims 9 and 13(a) based on its determination that the ineffective assistance of counsel 
exception does not apply to claims that could have been raised on direct appeal but were 
not so raised. RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Kell's Memorandum 
in Support of Objection to State's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "This court generally reviews interpretations of rules for 
correctness...." State ex. rel. S.M., 154 P.3d 835 (Utah 2007), citing In re Fox, 89 P.3d 127 
(Utah 2004). 
ISSUE #3: Whether the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment on 
claim 16(e) based on its finding that no objection was filed in Petitioner's Opposing 
Memorandum. RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Kell's Memorandum 
in Support of Objection to State's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "This court generally reviews interpretations of rules for 
correctness...." State ex. rel. S.M., 154 P.3d 835 (Utah 2007), citing In re Fox, 89 P.3d 127 
(Utah 2004). "When an appellate court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, while the district court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness." Massey v. 
Griffiths, 152 P.3d 312 (Utah 2007). 
"Challenge to a summary judgment presents for review only conclusions of law 
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because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment do not resolve factual 
disputes." Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 148 P.3d 983 (Utah 2006). 
ISSUE #4: Whether the trial court improperly violated the rules governing 
summary judgment motions by dismissing all remaining claims by granting summary 
judgment in favor of the State and against the Petitioner on those claims and placing the 
burden of proof on Kell. RECORD CITATION: This issue was raised below in Kell's 
Memorandum in Support of Objection to State's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary 
Judgment. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "Challenge to a summary judgment presents for 
review only conclusions of law because, by definition, cases decided on summary judgment 
do not resolve factual disputes." Ellsworth v. American Arbitration Ass'n, 148 P.3d 983 
(Utah 2006). "When an appellate court reviews a district court's grant of summary 
judgment, the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party, while the district court's legal conclusions and 
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment are reviewed for correctness." Massey v. 
Griffiths, 152 P.3d 312 (Utah 2007). 
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim . . .presents a question of law" that this 
Court reviews for correctness. State v. Clark, 89 P.3d 162 (Utah 2004). To demonstrate 
ineffective assistance of counsel, "'a defendant must show (1) that counsel's performance 
was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but 
for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the 
trial would have been different.'" Wickham v. Galetka, 61 P.3d 978 (Utah 2002) (quoting 
State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 243 (Utah 1995)); see also, Strickland v. Washington, 466 
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U.S. 668, 686-87, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 LEd.2d 674 (1984). 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
Pursuant to Ut R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A), these issues were preserved in the trial court 
and are contained in the district court's order in the Memorandum Decision on Motion to 
Dismiss and For Partial Summary Judgment signed by the district court on January 23, 
2007. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES 
A. U.S. Const. Amends V, VI and XIV 
B. Utah Const. Art I §§7 and 12 
C. Ut. R. Civ. P. 56 
D. Ut. R. Civ. P. 65C 
E. Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-106(2) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an Order of the Sixth District Court, Manti Department, 
Honorable David L. Mower granting the State's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
(i) Mr. Kell was moved to Utah from the Nevada Correctional Facilities and was 
housed in Gunnison, Utah, also known as the Central Utah Correctional 
Facility (CUCF). 
(ii) While there housed, Mr. Kell fatally stabbed Mr. Blackmon and Mr. Kell was 
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then charged with murder, a capital felony, 
(iii) Mr. Kell was found guilty and sentenced to death on June 21, 1996. 
(iv) On September 6,1996 an appeal was filed with this Court, the Utah Supreme 
Court, 
(v) This Court issued its decision on November 1, 2002, State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 
1019 (Utah 2002). 
(vi) The case was then remitted to the district court on November 21, 2002. On 
April 29, 2003, the death warrant was signed, 
(vii) On May 16, 2003, the State Habeas Petition was filed, case number 
030600171. On May 28,2003, a stay of that death warrant was signed by the 
district court. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In May of 2003, this matter was initiated by the filing of a Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief and/or Habeas Corpus respecting the conviction of Troy Michael Kell ("Kell") of 
capital murder. Judge David L. Mower of the Sixth Judicial District Court was assigned. On 
February 11,2004, Judge Mower released Kell's then-attorney, Mr. Michael D. Esplin, and, 
on February 25, 2004, appointed counsel herein to represent Kell in further proceedings 
respecting the Petition at issue herein. 
On June 16,2004, the matter came for hearing before the trial court on Kell's request 
for appointment of an investigator and mitigation specialist. At this hearing, the trial court 
directed counsel to submit their amended petition no later than September 15, 2004. After 
having been granted extensions and given authority to file an overlength memorandum, 
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counsel filed the Petition on August 1, 2005, as defined supra, amending the original filing 
initiating the case. 
The Petition alleged instances in which Kell's trial and appellate counsel had been 
ineffective; to wit: (1) failure to seek interlocutory review of an order denying change of 
venue; (2) failure to move for change of the jury panel or change of venue; (3) failure to 
gather empirical data; (4) failure to include all issues; (5) failure to object to the reasonable 
doubt jury instruction; (6) failure to object to the admission of the video; (7) failure to admit 
relevant evidence in the form of the entire "Dear Luther" letter to the jury; (8) failure to 
challenge the autopsy report; (9) failing to provide adequate investigation; (10) failure to 
obtain an expert; (11) failure to file necessary pretrial motions; (12) failure to investigate 
witnesses; (13) failure to advise Kell of his Fifth Amendment rights; (14) failure to advise 
Kell of the adversary nature of the proceedings; (15) failure to challenge State actions as 
it pertains to insufficiently trained guards and correctional staff in their failure to intervene; 
(16) failure to adequately challenge the perjured testimony of Colon, an alleged eyewitness 
to the crime; (17) failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct; (18) failure to adequately 
advise Kell of his right to testify; (19) failure to request that all bench conferences be 
recorded; (20) failing to adequately prepare witnesses to testify so they do not present 
harmful evidence; and (21) failing to adequately plead all issues on appeal. 
On December 2, 2005, the State filed the State's Motion to Dismiss and For Partial 
Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support of State's Motion to Dismiss and For 
Partial Summary Judgment (collectively, the "Dismissal Motion"), constituting 
approximately 100 pages exclusive of the attachments. On March 31, 2006, counsel filed 
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the Petitioner's Objection to Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment and 
accompanying Memorandum in Support of Objection to State's Motion to Dismiss and for 
Partial Summary Judgment (collectively, the "Objection"). On June 20, 2006, the State 
filed its Reply Memorandum in Support of State's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial 
Summary Judgment (the "Reply"), further requesting incorporation of Kell's criminal 
proceedings into the current proceedings. Although oral arguments were initially 
anticipated, the Dismissal Motion, Objection and Reply were eventually submitted for 
determination on the pleadings themselves. 
On January 23, 2007, the trial court entered its Memorandum Decision on Motion to 
Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Judgment"). A copy of the Judgment is 
attached hereto as Addendum "A" and incorporated herein by this reference. In the 
Judgment, the trial court dismissed claims 8, 10, 11, 14 and 15(b)1 on the basis that the 
"ineffective assistance of counsel exception does not apply to claims that have been raised 
on direct appeal. See, Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-106(2)." See, Addendum "A" at pp. 4-6. 
The trial court also dismissed claims 9 and 13(a) pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-35a-
106(2), stating that they were barred since they "could and should have been raised on 
direct appeal" and that Kell may not raise them "for the first time in a post-conviction 
petition." See, Addendum "A" at pp. 6-7. The trial court dismissed a portion of claim 16(e) 
which asserted that trial counsel should have sought interlocutory review of the trial court's 
decision to try Petitioner at the CUCF on the basis that Kell had failed to evidence a genuine 
issue for trial. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 7-8. 
1
 The claim numbering contained in the Judgment does not correspond to the list 
herein provided on pp. 6 and 7, but rather to the list as set forth in the Petition. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 13(b) pertaining to trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness on presenting an adequate reasonable doubt jury instruction on the basis 
that he failed to present adequate evidence of such failure as required under Ut. R. Civ. P. 
65C(d)(1) and 56(e). See, Addendum "A" at p. 10. The trial court granted summary 
judgment on claim 15(a) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to admit into evidence the entire 
"Dear Luther" letter on the basis that Kell had misstated the law and did not cite to any 
authority supporting this argument. See, Addendum "A" at p. 11. The trial court granted 
summary judgment as to claim 16(a) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to devote sufficient 
time to the case and failure to conduct adequate pretrial investigation on the basis that Kell 
failed to present adequate evidence of such failure as required under Ut. R. Civ. P. 
65C(d)(1) and 56(e). See, Addendum "A" at pp. 11-12. The trial court granted summary 
judgment on claims 16(b) and (c) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to consider other 
possible venues and for failing to adequately support his motion for change of venue on the 
basis that he failed to adequately support such a claim for relief, failed to demonstrate 
prejudice resulting therefrom, and failed to show that his counsel was ineffective. See, 
Addendum "A" at pp. 12-13. The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 16(d) 
pertaining to trial counsel's failure to adequately brief issues regarding the trial being held 
in the CUCF on the basis that Kell failed to submit specific facts to support his claim. See, 
Addendum "A" at p. 13. The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 16(e) pertaining 
to trial counsel's failure to raise the venue issue through interlocutory order on the basis that 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims cannot rely on hindsight and that no additional 
evidence or argument demonstrated ineffectiveness. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 13-14. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment on claims 16(f) and (g) pertaining to trial 
counsel's failure to adequately brief and research pretrial motions on the basis that Kell's 
claims are not properly supported with facts as required by Ut. R. Civ. P. 65C(d)(1) and 
56(e). See, Addendum "A" at pp. 14-15. The trial court granted summary judgment on 
claim 16(h) pertaining to failure to sufficiently investigate, interview or secure potential 
witnesses on the basis that Kell failed to demonstrate prejudice or support the claim with 
specific facts. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 15-16. The trial court granted summary judgment 
on claim 16(i) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to advise Kell of dangers of engaging in 
conversations with custodial officers or other persons on the basis that Kell did not describe 
any specific conversations, failed to specify the information of which his trial counsel should 
have been aware in order to trigger the duty, and failed to demonstrate prejudice even if 
counsel was ineffective. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 16-17. The trial court granted summary 
judgment on claim 16(j) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to object to the original transfer 
of Kell under the Interstate Compact Agreement, on the basis that this due process 
argument rested upon his self-defense claim already heard on direct appeal and rejected 
by this Court. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 17-18. The trial court granted summary judgment 
on claim 16(k) pertaining to the prosecutorial misconduct, on the basis that he fails to 
support his claim with specific facts. See, Addendum "A" at p. 18. The trial court granted 
summary judgement on claims 16(l)-(q) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to challenge five 
(5) prospective jurors for cause on the basis that Kell did not demonstrate that there was 
a genuine issue of fact respecting the Litherland factors which overcome the presumption 
that counsel's choice was conscious and strategic. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 18-20. The 
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trial court granted summary judgment on claim 16(r) pertaining to trial counsel's failure to 
object to prosecutor's opening statements that were argumentative, on the basis that he did 
not identify the statements and failed to submit evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue 
of material fact. See, Addendum "A" at p. 20. The trial court granted summary judgment 
on claim 16(s), pertaining to trial counsel's failure to advise him as to whether or not he 
should testify, on the basis that he failed to provide specific facts pertaining to the claim. 
See, Addendum "A" at p. 21. The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 16(t), 
pertaining to trial counsel's failure to have bench conferences transcribed, on the basis that 
Kell failed to show prejudice through specific facts. See, Addendum "A" at p. 21. The trial 
court granted summary judgment on claim 17(a), pertaining to the same issue in claim 16(r), 
supra, and on the same basis. See, Addendum "A" at p. 22. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 17(b). See, Addendum "A" at p. 
22. Although the trial court pointed out in the Judgment that no request for summary 
judgment was made respecting claim 17(b), it determined that it must have been an 
oversight and granted summary judgment nonetheless. 
The claim in 17(b) pertains to whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make 
an opening statement informing the jury of Kell's position. Id. The trial court determined 
that Kell had not evidenced prejudice and sua sponte granted summary judgment on the 
claim. Id. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 17(c), pertaining to trial counsel's 
failure to object to the presentation of highly prejudicial victim impact testimony, determining 
that there was no prejudice according to the decision rendered by this Court on direct 
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appeal. See, Addendum "A" at p. 23, fn. 4. The trial court granted summary judgment on 
claim 17(d), pertaining to trial counsel's presentation of witnesses who offered aggravating 
rather than mitigating evidence on Kell's behalf, on the basis that Kell did not identify the 
witnesses or the testimony pertaining to the challenge. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 23-24. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 17(e), pertaining to trial counsel's failure 
to object to improper closing arguments from the prosecution, on the basis that Kell did not 
identify the arguments or "demonstrate with reasonable probability how a proper objection 
would have changed the outcome of the penalty phase." See, Addendum "A" at p. 24. The 
trial court granted summary judgment on claim 18(a), pertaining to trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness in the conviction, sentence and direct appeal, on the basis that Kell failed 
to identify specific issues. See, Addendum "A" at p. 26. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 18(b) because Kell did not 
address how these issues would have resulted in reversal on appeal. See, Addendum "A" 
at p. 26. 
The trial court granted summary judgment on claim 18(c), claiming that it pertained 
to the same issue as claim 16(j) and determining it on the same basis that the claim was 
already heard and determined in the direct appeal. See, Addendum "A" at pp. 26-27. The 
trial court failed to render a determination as to claim 18(d), pertaining to Kell's contention 
that the ineffectiveness of trial counsel prejudiced the outcome of the case, finding that it 
was a legal conclusion rather than a claim for relief. 
On February 21,2007, Kell timely filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgment in the 
above-captioned appeal. 
11 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is, at best, a tool to terminally end a pleading. Summary 
judgment is not favored by the court, and requires a strict and narrow application of Rule 
56 of the Ut. R. Civ. P. It also allows the non-moving party to be given the benefit of having 
all inferences considered in a light most favorable to that party. The lower court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the State of Utah on each and every claim raised in the 
Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
The first argument goes to the trial court having granted the motion to dismiss of 
claims 8,9,10,11,13(a), 14 and 15(b) and the court's determination that those claims were 
previously raised and rejected on direct appeal. The trial court could review the findings 
and allow a hearing if it were in the "interests of justice" and in a death penalty case the 
interests of justice should always allow for a review of all claims, even if previously not so 
granted by an appellate court. 
Additionally, although there has not been a "change of controlling authority" there has 
been a case from another jurisdiction's Supreme Courts that would provide persuasive 
authority to discontinue the practice of holding trials in prison, and require a re-trial. 
The second argument goes to the trial court having dismissed issues that should 
have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, and dismissed claims 9 and 13(a) under 
that theory. The exception here is whether Petitioner can demonstrate that the ineffective 
assistance of counsel was an intervening cause and clearly these two issues meet the 
definition of that exception as found in the statute. 
The third argument is an issue of summary judgment, wherein the court dismissed 
Petitioner's claim 16(e) holding that Petitioner did not object to the Respondent's request 
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for summary judgment. The court decided that by Petitioner not responding specifically to 
claim 16(e) in his responsive pleading summary judgment should issue. That decision is 
not supported by the law. All pleadings can be considered as evidence in a motion for 
summary judgment. A writ of habeas is construed to create genuine issue of fact. 
Summary judgment should have been denied on claim 16(e). This decision is also 
inconsistent with the court dismissing sua sponte a claim not objected to by the State. 
The fourth argument is where the trial court dismissed all remaining claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt and penalty phase of the trial and on direct 
appeal. The court here inappropriately shifted the burden of proof to the Petitioner by 
requiring that Petitioner demonstrate that there was a genuine issue of material fact with 
respect to each prong of the Strickland test Again, counsel argues that the allegation of 
violation of the ineffective assistance of counsel in the document itself, when looked at in 
terms of summary judgment, must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, i.e. Kell. Therefore, these allegations have met the Strickland test for 
purposes of summary judgment and the court should not have granted summary judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING CLAIMS 8, 9,10,11,13(a), 14 AND 15(b) 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-106(2) ON ITS DETERMINATION THAT 
THOSE CLAIMS WERE PREVIOUSLY RAISED AND REJECTED ON DIRECT APPEAL 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106 in its entirety states: 
1) A person is not eligible for relief under this chapter upon any ground that: 
(a) may still be raised on direct appeal or by a post-trial motion; 
(b) was raised or addressed at trial or on appeal; 
(c) could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal; 
(d) was raised or addressed in any previous request for post-conviction relief 
or could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
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conviction relief; or 
(e) is barred by the limitation period established in Section 78-35a-107. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on 
a basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on 
appeal, if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Petitioner is able to raise any and all issues that were laid out in his Petition under 
subparagraph (2) of this statute, i.e. ineffective assistance of counsel. Also, § 78-35a-
104(1)(a), (b) and (d) are applicable, i.e. these convictions were obtained in violation of the 
United States and Utah Constitutions and the statutes were in violation of the same 
Constitutions and the Petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of both the 
United States and Utah Constitutions. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104 states in part: 
(1) Unless precluded by Section 78-35a-106 or 78-35a-107, a person who 
has been convicted and sentenced for a criminal offense may file an action 
in the district court of original jurisdiction for post-conviction relief to vacate or 
modify the conviction or sentence upon the following grounds: 
(a) the conviction was obtained or the sentence was imposed in violation of 
the United States Constitution or Utah Constitution; 
(b) the conviction was obtained under a statute that is in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution, or the conduct for which the 
petitioner was prosecuted is constitutionally protected; . . . 
(d) the petitioner had ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the 
United States Constitution or Utah Constitution.. . . 
As to Petitioner's claim 8, that the Petitioner was denied his Constitutional rights to 
a public trial and to the presumption of equal protection of the law, the Petitioner would point 
out to the Court that since the Court's ruling in Kell's appeal, State v. Kell, 61 P.3d 1019 
(Utah 2002), the other court looking at this identical issue with facts that are on point has 
ruled that holding trials in prison facilities is a practice that is inherently prejudicial. A 
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notable case is State v. Cavan, 98 P.3d 381 (OR 2004). In that case, the prisoner had been 
charged with assaulting a prison guard by repeatedly hitting him with a homemade sap and 
biting off a piece of the officer's cheek and attempting to spit it into the officer's mouth. 
They charged this defendant with first degree assault, second degree assault, fourth degree 
assault, assaulting a public safety officer and being an inmate in possession of a weapon. 
This defendant had an extensive disciplinary record, involvements with earlier violent 
escape attempts from other facilities and this unprovoked attack. The trial court found that 
this record of behavior on the defendant's part required that he be tried in the prison. The 
Oregon court found that under the two part federal inquiry (SeeHolbrookv. Flynn, 475 U.S. 
560, 569, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1986)). That test is whether the challenged 
practice is inherently prejudicial and, if so, whether an essential state interest justified the 
decision. The court held that a prison trial did not meet either Federal or Oregon State 
Constitutional muster. In fact, the court held as follows: 
To be sure, the charges in this case arose out of an incident at the prison, 
and the jurors could have inferred that the court elected to hold the trial at the 
prison for administrative rather than safety reasons. But the decision to hold 
a trial at a prison is such a departure from the ordinary course, and the risk 
of singling defendant out in some impermissible way is sufficiently great, that 
we hold that the practice is inherently prejudicial. 
In addition, the court in Cavan held: 
Unlike the public courthouse, prisons like SRCI are inherently dangerous 
places that the public, as a general matter, is unlikely to visit. A jury's 
perception of the neutrality of the proceedings that attend a trial in the public 
courthouse obviously is diminished when the court convenes a trial within the 
environs of a prison such as SRCI. Gone is a jury's perception that the 
proceeding is in the firm control of the impartial and independent judiciary. 
Instead, the prison environment reminds the jury that the prison houses the 
most dangerous elements of society, many of whom are moving about within 
a few feet of the prison courtroom, and that the jury's physical safety, and to 
a large extent, the trial itself, are in the control of the prison administrators and 
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corrections personnel. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, convening a 
trial in a prison such as SRCI and not in a courthouse forcefully conveys to a 
jury the overriding impression of a defendant's dangerousness and we think, 
by extension, his or her guilt. 
In fact, in footnote eight of the decision, the court noted "Our review of similar cases 
in other jurisdictions indicates that only one jurisdiction, Utah, unequivocally allows trials in 
prisons." (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, clearly this Court is in a minority position and in a conflict with other state 
Supreme Courts in analyzing Federal Constitutional law under the Fifth, Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and this Court is the only Court 
that does not find, under federal law, that there is an inherent prejudice by holding trials in 
such a manner. Therefore, Petitioner submits that this Court's prior decision is clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice and, therefore, claims 8, 10, 11, 14 and 
15(b) should not have been dismissed, and Kell should have had an opportunity to present 
evidence before the trial court on these issues so the court could make factual findings. 
The Cavan court also analyzed this procedure under their own individual State 
Constitution, and although their Constitution is worded differently than the Utah State 
Constitution, Petitioner submits that this Court should also analyze the practice under State 
Constitutional grounds. 
This Court has consistently requested that counsel request and brief State 
Constitutional analysis and, oftentimes, is not able to do so because the issue is not raised. 
Counsel below requested the trial court analyze these issues on both State and Federal 
Constitutional law. Therefore, counsel submits to this Court that the analysis done by the 
trial court encompasses both State and Federal Constitutional analysis as the same. 
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Petitioner would argue that this Court has, in other areas, expanded the rights of citizens 
of Utah under the Utah State Constitution, and that Article I §§ 7 and 12 have greater 
protections than they do under the Federal Constitution. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ERRONEOUSLY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON CLAIMS 9 AND 13(a) BASED ON ITS DETERMINATION THAT THE INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY TO CLAIMS THAT COULD 
HAVE BEEN RAISED ON DIRECT APPEAL BUT WERE NOT SO RAISED?. 
In this issue, the court lays out the correct test, i.e. claims that could and should have 
been raised on direct appeal may not be raised for the first time in the post-conviction case, 
except for when that failure is due to the ineffective assistance of counsel. See, Utah Code. 
Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). The trial court was also correct in indicating that there were two 
claims that fell under this category, claims 9 and 13(a). The court then states in the first 
sentence of the third paragraph "Petitioner had sufficient facts at the time of his direct 
appeal to raise both of these claims before the Utah Supreme Court, but he chose not to 
do so." Then, amazingly, the court in the very next sentence says "Petitioner has not shown 
that the failure to raise these claims was due to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel." 
The court's statement flies in the face of all logic and reason. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is defined under Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668 (1984) "(1) that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) that 
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 686. Under the first prong of the 
test, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made errors so serious that [he] was 
not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 
687. 
Kell's appellate counsel was clearly ineffective. Effective assistance of counsel 
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mandated that the issues now raised by his current counsel, i.e, those set forth in claims 
9 and 13(a), had to be raised by prior counsel. Failure to raise these issues deprived the 
Petitioner of not only potential defenses to a capital crime, but hamstrung defense 
strategies. If the failure was knowing and intentional, as an appeal strategy, it was woefully 
below a recognized standard of competence required for capital offense appellate work. 
If it was not, there is no other conclusion that can be drawn but that counsel was ignorant 
of the law. Irrespective of the reason, it is clear that Kell's representation here was below 
par. 
In fact, this is the very kernel of ineffective assistance of counsel: had prior counsel 
actually provided effective assistance, then these claims would have been brought on direct 
appeal. The fact that prior counsel did not bring these claims on direct appeal 
demonstrates a lack of competence and ineffective assistance. Furthermore, by failing to 
raise these claims, Kell suffered prejudice because these claims were never heard by this 
Court. The efficacy of their arguments could never be heard because they were not raised. 
On capital cases, the lack thereof is even more pronounced because the consequences are 
so much more severe. The court having held that Petitioner had not shown that his failure 
to raise these claims was due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This 
essentially begs the question as to if appellate counsel did not raise them, who would? 
Failure of Petitioner's previous counsel to raise those claims is a direct evidence of 
the ineffective assistance of counsel because of the prejudice to the Petitioner. Therefore, 
in accordance with §78-35a-106(2), Petitioner is entitled to raise them in his Habeas Corpus 
petition at this time and have an evidentiary hearing thereon. It was not Kell who was 
captain of the ship, it was Kell's attorneys. The captain of the ship must have the requisite 
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knowledge of navigation to avoid the shoals, not the seaman swabbing the deck. Likewise, 
it was Kell's counsel who has the purported background and experience necessary to 
ensure that the appellate defense is fairly presented, without egregious errors. Each and 
every claim raised by Kell is a recitation of a failure to act as a prudent attorney in like 
circumstances should have acted in protection of Kell's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
Also, the court in Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah 1994) stated that: 
absent the existence of unusual circumstances, a 'party may not raise the 
issues in a habeas corpus petition that could or should have been raised on 
direct appeal.'.. .We have held that unusual circumstances exist when a trial 
counsel represented the defendant on direct appeal and the defendant in a 
subsequent habeas proceeding contends that he had ineffective assistance 
of counsel at trial, on appeal, or both. 
The showing of "unusual circumstances" is met in the Kell case where the same 
counsel represented Petitioner at trial and on appeal. Thus, the Petitioner's unusual 
circumstances allow him to raise the issue of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim and 
the trial court therefore erred in granting summary judgment. 
Moreover, pursuant to §78-35a-106(2), 
[notwithstanding Subsection (1)(c), a person may be eligible for relief on a 
basis that the ground could have been but was not raised at trial or on appeal, 
if the failure to raise that ground was due to ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In this case, due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the claims as referred to supra 
have not been raised and, therefore, entitled the Petitioner to argue these claims in his 
Habeas Corpus Writ. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ERRONEOUSLY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
ON CLAIMS 16(e) BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT NO OBJECTION WAS FILED IN THE 
PETITIONER'S OPPOSING MEMORANDUM. 
Here the court lays out the standard for summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Ut. 
19 
R. Civ. P. The court correctly indicated that the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issues as to material fact. Petitioner's pleading, the Amended Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus 16(e) states "Trial counsel failed to seek 
interlocutory review of the adverse ruling on the issue of venue and trial in the prison." The 
court then points out that a moving party must satisfy a burden of producing sufficient 
evidence in opposition to those pleadings, depositions or answers. In the Dismissal Motion, 
the State laid out a dispute as to their perception as to whether or not this was ineffective 
assistance. In their footnote sixteen, the State said "Kell would have to prove that the trial 
court's refusal to change venue undermines the competence in the outcome of his trial 
itself." The moving party, the State, did not provide any evidence, merely legal argument. 
The court then determined the opposing party, Kell, must have responded to a legal 
argument, not facts in opposition, and that Kell had to respond with specific facts in order 
to survive summary judgment. The court then cites to 65C(3) of the Ut. R. Civ. P. and 
states "If necessary, the Petitioner should attach to the position affidavits, copies of records, 
or other evidence in support of the allegations." Again, Petitioner argues this was not 
necessary. The Petition laid out Kell's trial counsel was ineffective by not attempting to take 
an interlocutory appeal to this Court on the trial court's ruling on where the trial would be 
held, i.e. the CUCF. That allegation in and of itself was never contradicted by facts from the 
State in its Reply and, therefore, Kell did not have to respond with more facts to survive 
summary judgment. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY VIOLATED THE RULES GOVERNING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT MOTIONS BY DISMISSING ALL REMAINING CLAIMS BY GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR IN THE STATE AND AGAINST PETITIONER AND 
IMPROPERLY PLACING THE BURDEN OF PROOF ON THE PETITIONER. 
Summary judgment is, at best, a tool to terminally end a pleading. It is not favored 
by the court, and requires a strict and narrow application of Rule 56 of the Ut. R. Civ. P. It 
also allows the non-moving party to be given the benefit of having all inferences considered 
in a light most favorable to that party. The lower court granted summary judgment in favor 
of the State of Utah, or dismissal, on all thirty remaining claims of ineffective assistance of 
counsel raised in the Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
The court then stated that the Petitioner must demonstrate that there was a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to every claim and to each prong as set forth in 
Strickland. The court's analysis was that to survive summary judgment, the Petitioner must 
plead facts that show there is a genuine issue of material fact showing that prior counsel, 
on each of the claims, was Constitutionally deficient, and but for that deficiency, the 
outcome may have been different and that it undermines the confidence in the outcome of 
the trial. 
Counsel herein hereby adopts and incorporates by reference all other arguments, 
facts and reasoning as laid out in the Appellant's Brief above and for use and convenience 
will not reargue all of those issues and arguments that are the same here as they were in 
the prior three issues. 
Many of the facts that the court required that Petitioner show would require the 
proving of a negative and, therefore, could not be referred to in other discovery materials 
or evidence or other pleadings. Likewise, many of the State's allegations in the Dismissal 
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Motion that were denied by the Petitioner could not be pointed out, to prove the opposite 
in any other pleading. Many facts in the Dismissal Motion referred either to an act or a 
failure to act by counsel that happened or did not happen. Hence, this is why the rules 
governing summary judgment require that a reviewing court must accept as true the 
allegations or assertions of a non-moving party. When the moving party for summary 
judgment alleges that an act happened, and the non-moving party indicates that act did not 
happen, the court is left with a "did not-did so" scenario. Oftentimes, no evidence exists, 
without an evidentiary hearing, that can show that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
except for a non-moving party's insistence that the act did or did not occur. Such is the 
case in the Petitioner's Writ and the State's Dismissal Motion. Therefore, in the upcoming 
analysis, counsel for Petitioner will not repeat this argument for every claim, but merely go 
through each claim and show how, by the alleging of the claim, under Strickland, the failure 
of counsel to so act was per se deficient and per se caused prejudice. As a result the 
lower court's ruling should be overturned and the Petitioner should be allowed to have an 
evidentiary hearing on all of these issues. To shift this burden to Petitioner was error. 
Also, as to ineffective assistance of counsel, the United States Supreme Court has 
taken as its standard for sufficiency of counsel the American Bar Association (ABA) 
Guidelines as a minimum required to pass Constitutional muster, Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
U.S. 510, 156 L.Ed. 2d. 471, 2003 S.Ct. 134(2003). See, Addendum "C." At the time this 
trial was held and the direct appeal taken, the 1989 ABA Guidelines were in effect. Those 
guidelines were revised in 2003, and all references herein are to the 1989 standards. 
Claim 13(b) of the Petitioner was that of counsel being ineffective and failing to 
provide an adequate reasonable doubt instruction. The reasonable doubt instruction that 
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was used in this case is the identical reasonable doubt instruction that was determined to 
be reversible error in State v. Reyes, 116 P.3d. 305 (Utah 2005). Although this instruction 
has been found to pass Constitutional scrutiny by this Court under Federal Constitutional 
analysis (See, Taylorv. State, 156 P.3d 739 (Utah 2007)) itwas and is still error under State 
Constitutional grounds. The fact that counsel did not object to this instruction meets both 
prongs of the Strickland test. 
Claim 15(a) was an allegation that trial counsel failed to adequately present the entire 
"Dear Luther letter." The introduction of this evidence with the entire letter not being 
introduced so that it could be read in context was ineffective under both prongs of 
Strickland. It also violated the ABA Guideline 11.5.1(B)12. 
Claim 16(a) was a claim that trial counsel failed to conduct an effective and complete 
investigation due to the demands of trial counsel's practice, i.e. that they did not live up to 
the ABA's standards in effect at that time, not as the court states merely that they failed to 
conduct an adequate investigation. The allegation in that claim was linked to counsel's 
qualifications under the ABA Guidelines. Trial and appellate counsel did not meet said 
qualifications. See, Addendum "C" at 5.1 I & II, 11.4.1 and 11.9.1 & 2. 
Claims 16(b) and (c) are claims that counsel was ineffective by inadequately 
supporting the Motion for Change of Venue with proper research and the court indicates in 
its Judgment that insufficient facts were alleged. However, counsel for Kell in his Objection 
detailed approximately four pages worth of efforts that could and should have been made 
to block the trial being held at the CUCF. Therefore, the court was incorrect in granting 
summary judgment on these claims. See, Objection pp. 24-30. 
23 
Petitioner's claim 16(d) was a statement by the court that no facts nor specific expert 
testimony were provided for the effect of prison location on jurors and witnesses. Again, 
counsel would point the Court to the holding in the Cavan case where the court held: 
to the characterization of the . . . prison environment by the defendant or by 
this court is not a matter of speculation; rather, it is beyond dispute that the 
[prison] setting 'enfolds the defendant in prison accouterments,' just as 
defendant argues. More to the point, however, we refuse to accept the state's 
underlying (but unstated) premise that, without evidence to the contrary, we 
should presume that jurors are indifferent to their surroundings. Our 200-year 
American jury trial tradition informs us that exactly the opposite is true. 
The court also denied Petitioner's claim 16(f) and (g). Those allegations are that 
counsel failed to adequately brief and research pretrial motions which were filed. This 
violated the ABA Guidelines in 11.5.1. Those motions are a matter of record and are part 
of the pleadings in the case. Therefore, those allegations are sufficient on their face to 
show a violation of both prongs of Strickland. 
As to the court's analysis of claim 16(h), this is specifically laid out, yet the court 
states that "even if trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable here, 
Petitioner has not provided any evidence demonstrating prejudice." The fact that witnesses 
could have been called that weren't may have made a difference not only at the guilt phase, 
but very much so at the penalty phase and clearly it is an appealable issue that was not 
adequately presented on direct appeal and therefore meets both prongs of Strickland as 
well as violating the ABA Guidelines 11.4.1(3), 11.8.2, 3 & 6 . 
Under the court's analysis of claim 16(i), the court again states that even though 
counsel may have failed to warn the Petitioner of the danger of speaking to correctional 
facility personnel and that his comments may have been misconstrued and colored by that 
testimony, nevertheless the Petitioner did not demonstrate prejudice. The testimony that 
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was offered on rebuttal after the Petitioner's penalty phase evidence was sufficiently 
damaging to make the difference between a finding for life without parole and a finding for 
the death penalty. After Petitioner apologized to the family, jail staff then testified that 
Petitioner told them he should win an Academy Award, which essentially sounded the death 
knell for Kell. Petitioner feels that if this is not prejudice, than no prejudice in the realm of 
the law can exist. This failure on trial counsels' part meets both prongs of Strickland. 
Claim 160")is the c ' a ' m o f t h e original transfer from Nevada to the CUCF because 
Nevada did not have authorization to transfer Kell to Utah under the interstate compact 
existing at the time. Clearly, the due process claim does not rest only on a self-defense 
claim, but on a prejudice claim that "but for" the transfer, Kell would never have been put 
in the same facility in the same circumstances with Mr. Blackmon. So, it is not only a self-
defense claim, but a due process claim. This clearly was not litigated and shows ineffective 
assistance of counsel that meets both prongs of Strickland. 
Claim 16(k) goes to the testimony of a prosecution key witness and his perjury and 
counsels' lack to seize upon that perjury. The court said facts were not plead. Clearly, 
enough facts are known by the court to understand that the Petitioner has alleged that a 
prosecution witness has perjured himself and that counsel failed to point out that perjury to 
discredit that witness. Therefore, summary judgment should not have been granted. See 
a/so, Addendum "C" at 11.7.3. 
Claims 16(l)-(q) are claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to properly 
challenge jurors for cause. Again, the court states after a long analysis that if even if trial 
counsel was ineffective, the Petitioner did not demonstrate actual prejudice. Again, counsel 
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for Petitioner would argue that a biased juror is, per se, prejudice and therefore the 
Strickland test is met. Therefore, the court should not have granted summary judgment on 
this claim. See also, Addendum "C" at 11.7.3 
As to claims 16(r), 17(a) and 17(e), the court indicated that Petitioner did not identify 
the statements in the opening arguments that were improper and why the failure by counsel 
to make one in the penalty phase is ineffective. The transcripts are part of the record and 
no further production of specific evidence is necessary when the record is part of what is 
to be considered in summary judgment. These errors by trial counsel meet the 
Strickland test and violate ABA Guideline 11.7.3. 
In the court's analysis of claim 16(s) the Petitioner asserted that trial counsel failed 
to adequately advise him as to whether or not he should testify at the guilt or innocence 
phase of the trial, and whether he would be subject to cross-examination. The Petition is 
a statement from the Petitioner on his behalf. His allegation is a specific fact that he 
indicated to counsel who was drafting the Petition. Petitioner's Writ contains his averment 
that this communication did not happen. No further facts need to be alleged; the pleading 
is sufficient in and of itself. An affidavit by the Petitioner would be redundant and 
surplusage. The court improperly granted summary judgment on that issue. 
On claim 16(t) the court stated that the failure to have bench conferences transcribed 
to preserve the record was not ineffective assistance of counsel. Again, clearly the 
preservation of an entire record is a basic tactic that is taught to all lawyers beginning in 
their first year of law school. "Preserve the record" is a mantra that is one of the earliest 
touchstones in legal training. The fact that counsel did not preserve the record by recording 
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bench conferences is, again, perse below the Strickland and ABA standards and is, perse, 
prejudicial since there is no possibility of finding out what was said at the bench conferences 
in any reliable fashion. 
On claim 17(b) the Petitioner argued that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed 
to make an opening statement informing the jury of Petitioner's position during the penalty 
phase. Although the Respondent did not request summary judgment on the claim, the court 
sua sponte granted summary judgment. This clearly was an error. The court should not 
have granted summary judgment where summary judgment was not requested. The court 
previously granted summary judgment on a claim unresponded to by Kell. This double 
standard is unjust. 
On claim 17(c) the court dismissed this claim because prejudice had not been 
shown. Again, without objecting, the court could not rule as to whether the evidence was 
admitted in to evidence or excluded therefrom. Although the court represented the 
evidence as not pivotal, without having the testimony of the family and the jury hearing the 
family's statements of loss and mourning, the jury may well have elected to grant the 
Petitioner life without parole as opposed to the death penalty. 
In the court's denial of Petitioner's claim 17(d), the court indicated that the Petitioner 
did not identify the witnesses, nor the parts of their testimony that were aggravating instead 
of mitigating. This testimony is included in the trial transcript and is, therefore, part of the 
record. The court should not have granted summary judgment on this issue. 
If on this issue, or any issue where the trial court claimed no evidence was in the 
pleadings, counsel in the alternative moves to supplement the record with the trial 
transcripts. 
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Claim 18(a)-(d) can be related back to claims argued in issue 2 supra. Clearly, the 
Petitioner has laid out at least two issues that were not addressed on appeal that should 
have been and would have under the federal standard, probably resulting in reversal on 
appeal as well as under State Constitutional law also been reversed. The court below has 
wrongfully shifted the burden to the Petitioner in denying these claims. 
All of these errors of trial and appellate counsel violated the Strickland standard 
under both Federal and State Constitutional grounds. Although counsel believes that each 
denied claim is sufficient individually to warrant reversal of the granting of summary 
judgment, counsel also claims that cumulatively the number of errors would be sufficient for 
reversal as well. Reversal of this case would not release Kell, it would only send it back to 
the trial court for an evidentiary hearing wherein post-conviction counsel could force trial 
and appellate counsel under the power of a subpoena to come and testify before the court 
as to these issues. Thereby, the trial court and this Court would have necessary facts in 
evidence to make a determination as to whether a new trial should be granted to Kell. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the trial court erred in dismissing and granting summary judgment 
on all of the Petitioner's claims in his Writ and the case should be remanded back to the 
trial court for an evidentiary hearing on all issues. 
DATED this r/ day of August, 2007. 
^AricCramer 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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This case is before the Court on Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial 
Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed the parties' memoranda, the relevant case law, and 
all applicable statutory provisions. Oral argument was scheduled for November 22, 2006, but did 
not take place. After a Motion to Continue that hearing was denied, the parties stipulated to 
submit the Motion based on the written memoranda. The Court now issues this ruling granting 
Respondent's Motion. 
Procedural History 
Following a jury trial held in the Central Utah Correctional Facility (CUCF) in 1996, 
Petitioner was found guilty of aggravated murder in the death of Lonnie Blackmon. Petitioner 
was subsequently sentenced to death by the jury at the conclusion of the penalty phase of the 
trial. 
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Petitioner's conviction and sentence were automatically reviewed by the Utah Supreme 
Court. On November 11, 2002, the Supreme Court issued a decision affirming Petitioner's 
conviction and sentence. See State v. Kelt, 61 P.3d 1019 (Utah 2002). 
A Preliminary Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed by the Petitioner on May 16, 
2003. On August 1, 2005, Petitioner filed his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus challenging his conviction and death sentence. 
On December 2, 2005, Respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Petitioner's opposition was filed on March 31, 2006. Respondent's reply was filed on 
June 20, 2006. Request to Submit for Decision was filed on June 29, 2006. 
Summary of the Parties' Arguments 
Petitioner makes the following claims that challenge his conviction and sentence: 
a. issues related to the jury selection process, such as death qualification and errors 
committed by the trial court judge concerning excusals and challenges for cause; 
b. issues related to the fairness of the trial proceedings such as improper instructions 
and errors in admitting evidence; 
c. ineffective assistance of trial counsel such as failure to conduct a complete 
pretrial investigation or to devote the necessary time to the case, failure to 
consider other places for change of venue, failure to support the motion for 
change of venue with data, polls, etc., failure to brief and raise issues related to 
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whether the trial should be held in the CUCF, failure to seek interlocutory review 
of the trial court's ruling on the venue issue, failure to adequately brief and 
research pretrial motions, failure to properly investigate and interview the State's 
potential witnesses, failure to tell the Petitioner not to talk to custodial officers, 
failure to object to the improper original transfer of Petitioner under the Interstate 
Compact Agreement, failure to properly investigate and illustrate prosecutorial 
misconduct, failure to appropriately challenge jurors during jury selection, failure 
to object to improper opening statements, failure to advise Petitioner that if he 
testified he would be subject to cross-examination, and failure to have the bench 
conferences during the trial recorded; 
d. ineffective assistance of trial counsel during the penalty phase of the trial such as 
failure to object to improper opening statements of the prosecutor, failure to make 
an opening statement, failure to object to prejudicial victim impact evidence, 
improperly calling witnesses that provided aggravating evidence, and failure to 
object to improper closing arguments by the prosecutor; and 
e. ineffective assistance of appellate counsel such as failure to raise ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel issues, failure to adequately brief and raise relevant 
issues on appeal, and failure to raise the issue of the legality of Petitioner's 
transfer from the State of Nevada to the State of Utah. 
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Respondent is seeking summary judgment arguing that (1) some claims are procedurally 
barred because they were raised and rejected on appeal; (2) some claims are barred because they 
could have been raised on appeal but were not; (3) some claims are not properly supported with 
facts sufficient to entitle Petitioner to post-conviction relief. 
Analysis1 
Section 1. Claims Previously Raised and Rejected on Direct Appeal 
A petition for post-conviction relief is not "a substitute for direct appellate review;" it 
only "collaterally attacks a conviction and/or a sentence." Gardner v. Holden, 888 P.2d 608, 613 
(Utah 1994). Thus, "[ijssues raised and disposed of on direct appeal of a conviction or a sentence 
cannot properly be raised again in a [post-conviction petition] and should be dismissed as an 
abuse of the writ without a ruling on the merits." Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-
106(l)(b). 
This general rule is subject to several exceptions. Claims that fall under this rule would 
not be dismissed if "there has been an intervening change of controlling authority ..., new 
evidence has become available, or ... [the Utah Supreme Court's] prior decision was clearly 
erroneous and would work a manifest injustice." Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 31 P.3d 
543, 546,H10 (Utah 2001). 
1
 The Court will follow Respondent's numbering of the claims raised in the Amended Petition i.e. the first 
claim raised by the Petitioner in paragraph 8 will be referred to as claim 8 rather than claim 1, etc. 
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All of the following claims were previously raised and rejected on direct appeal: 
1. claim 8 alleging that "the trial court erred by denying [Petitioner] his 
constitutional rights to a public trial, to the presumption of, and to equal 
protection of the law[ ] by trying him in a courtroom located inside [CUCF]." 
Amended Petition at 2. See Kell at 1026-27, fflfl 1-16; 
2. claim 10 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's fair trial rights by 
granting the prosecutor's request to remove two potential jurors for cause based 
upon their reluctance to impose a sentence of death, see Id. at 1027-28,1ffi 17-20; 
3. claim 11 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's rights to fair trial by 
improperly denying his challenges for cause, see Id. at 1028, f21; 
4. claim 14 alleging that the trial court violated Petitioner's rights to fair trial by 
allowing the jury to view a videotape of the homicide, see Id. at 1030-31, ff29-
31; and 
5. claim 15(b) alleging that Petitioner's rights to fair trial were violated because his 
trial counsel failed to challenge the admission of the autopsy report, and his 
appellate counsel failed to raise the issue on appeal. See Id. at 1031-32, ^37. 
Petitioner has not demonstrated that any of the exceptions described above apply here. 
Therefore, these claims are procedurally barred under Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-35a-
106(l)(b). 
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With respect to several of these claims, the Petitioner suggests that they were not 
effectively raised and argued by counsel and, therefore, his Sixth Amendment right to the 
effective assistance of counsel on appeal was violated. See Amended Petition at 5, 10,15, and 
16. 
The ineffective assistance of counsel exception does not apply to claims that have been 
raised on direct appeal. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). A contrary rule would allow an 
issue already disposed of on direct appeal to be relitigated "under a different guise." Gardner at 
615. Petitioner should not be allowed to do that. 
For these reasons, Petitioner's claims 8,10, 11, 14, and 15(b) are dismissed. 
Section 2. Claims Petitioner Could Have Raised on Appeal But Did Not 
Claims that could and should have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised for the 
first time in a post-conviction petition. See Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 630, T|6 (Utah 2001). 
The exception is where a petitioner can demonstrate that "the failure to raise [these issues] was 
due to ineffective assistance of counsel." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(2). 
There are two claims that fall under this category: claim 9 and claim 13(a). Claim 9 
alleges that the "process of death qualification results in jurors who are more prone to convict 
and to disregard the presumption of innocence than those who are not." Amended Petition at 8. 
Claim 13(a) alleges that "the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally 
flawed since it did not provide sufficient guidance to the burden of proof to the jurors." Id. at 15. 
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Petitioner had sufficient facts at the time of his direct appeal to raise both of these claims 
before the Utah Supreme Court, but he chose not to do so. Petitioner has not shown that his 
failure to raise these claims was due to the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. 
It follows that claims 9 and 13(a) are barred by Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-35a-106(2). These claims are dismissed. 
Section 3. Claims for which Respondent has Requested Summary Judgment and No 
Objection Was Raised in Petitioner's Opposine Memorandum 
Summary judgment is appropriate only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). The purpose of summary judgment is 
"to eliminate the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). 
When a moving party satisfies his burden of producing sufficient evidence, the opposing 
party has his own burden to meet. He must "set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial;" mere allegations or denials of the pleadings are not sufficient. Utah R. 
Civ. P., Rule 56(e). If the party does not respond with specific facts, "[sjummary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against... [him]." TS1 Partnership v. Alfred, 877 P.2d 156, 158 
(UtahApp. 1994). 
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A similar requirement is also found in Rule 65C(c)(3) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Petitioner is required to set forth "in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form 
the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief." If necessary, the petitioner should "attach to the 
petition ... affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations." Id. Rule 
65C(d)(l). 
Petitioner chose not to respond to the Respondent's request for summary judgment on the 
portion of claim 16(e) which asserts that Petitioner's trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
seek interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to try Petitioner at the CUCF. See 
Amended Petition at 17. 
Petitioner has failed to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial. Consistent with Rule 56, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on that portion of 
claim 16(e). 
Section 4. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel at the Guilt or Innocence 
Phase 
Subsection 1. Standard of Review 
To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Petitioner must 
demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each prong of the test set 
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668 (1984). Under this test, Petitioner is required to 
show that (1) counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687; see also Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 
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(Utah 1988); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). The Court may look at those 
requirements in any order and if "it is easier to dispose of ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice ... that course should be followed." Id. at 697. 
Further, an attorney's performance is deficient if he has "made errors so serious that [he] 
was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [a] defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 
687. The seriousness of any errors is judged by whether counsel's representation was 
unreasonable under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. 
There is a strong presumption that counsel's representation "falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689. This presumption is partially based on the idea 
that counsel's actions are determined in many cases by the choices of the defendant and the 
information supplied by the defendant. Id. at 691. 
Therefore, in evaluating counsel's performance, the Court must make "every effort... to 
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's 
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Id. at 
689. Moreover, the assessment of counsel's performance cannot be based upon "what is prudent 
or appropriate, but only [upon] what is constitutionally compelled." United States v. Cronic, 466 
US 648, 665 n.38 (1984). 
Even if ineffectiveness is proven, prejudice must also be shown. To show prejudice, 
petitioner must demonstrate that "there is a reasonable probability [such that it undermines 
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confidence in the outcome] that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the 
proceeding would have been different2." Id. at 694. 
Subsection 2. Claim 13(b) 
In claim 13(b), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to provide an 
adequate reasonable doubt instruction. In the context of giving instructions, trial counsel 
performs deficiently if "the instructions, taken as a whole, [do not] correctly communicate the 
principle of reasonable doubt." State v. Cruz, 122 P.3d 543, 550, P21(Utah 2005), citing In re 
Wins hip, 397 US 358, 364 (1970). This means that the jury must be instructed that every fact 
necessary to constitute a crime must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Id. 
Petitioner does not describe how the reasonable doubt instruction was inadequate. He 
asserts that it was inadequate without giving any further facts or analysis. 
Petitioner is required under Rules 65C(d)(l) and 56(e) to present facts and support them 
with necessary affidavits, copies of record, or other evidence. Petitioner did not do that. 
Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact exists concerning trial counsel's effectiveness with 
respect to reasonable doubt instruction. Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted 
on claim 13(b). 
Subsection 3. Claim 15(a) 
2
 This showing is greater than simply demonstrating "that the errors had some conceivable effect on the 
outcome of the proceeding," but less than demonstrating "that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered 
the outcome in the case." Strickland at 693. 
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Claim 15(a) alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel in failing to admit into evidence 
the entire "Dear Luther" letter. Petitioner claims that if "the entirety of the letter been introduced, 
not just selected 'racist' parts, the jury would have had an entire[l]y different perception." 
Amended Petition at 15-16. In response to the State, Petitioner says that the Court "must assume 
that the letter would have assisted [him]" because the Court must look at all the facts in light 
most favorable to the non-moving party. Mem. in Opp. at 42. Petitioner does not cite to any 
authority supporting this argument. 
Petitioner's argument misstates the law. The Court is only required to believe the 
evidence and the facts presented by the non-moving party, which are properly supported by 
affidavits and other documents. See Anderson v. American Liberty Lobby, Inc., All US 242, 255 
(1986); Utah R. Civ. P., Rule 65C(d)(l) and Rule 56(e). The Court does not have to assume that 
the Petitioner's legal conclusions are correct. 
It appears that claim 15(a) is not properly supported by evidence. Respondent's Motion 
for Summary Judgment on claim 15(a) is granted. 
Subsection 4. Claim 16(a) 
Here, Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to devote sufficient time to the case 
and failed to conduct an adequate pretrial investigation. However, he does not indicate how these 
failings have prejudiced his case. He also does not give specific examples of deficiencies during 
the pretrial investigation. Petitioner's only argument is that his allegation alone "is enough 
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procedurally to pass summary judgment and not be dismissed." Mem. in Opp. at 43. 
This is again an incorrect statement of the law. As discussed in Subsection 3, Petitioner is 
required to produce facts and other evidence in support of his claim to show that there is a 
genuine issue of material fact that precludes entry of summary judgment. Because Petitioner has 
failed to do that, Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on claim 16(a) is granted. 
Subsection 5. Claims 16(b) and (c) 
Petitioner asserts in claim 16(b) that his trial counsel failed to consider other possible 
venue sites for the trial other than Salt Lake City. He says that his trial counsel was ineffective 
because he failed to adequately support the motion for change of venue with "data such as polls, 
questionaires [sic], or other demographic information to support the grounds for moving the 
trial." Amended Petition at 16. In his opposing memorandum, Petitioner argues that counsel 
should have been aware during voir dire that an impartial jury could not be selected and that 
"had a sufficient amount of work been done, the venue of the trial as well as the CUCF matter 
would have been concluded elsewhere." Mem. in Opp. at 39. 
These statements are re-assertions of the original claims brought by the Petitioner in his 
post-conviction petition. They do not contain sufficient facts to form a claim for relief under 
Rule 65C(c)(3). Moreover, even if the trial counsel's performance was deficient, Petitioner has 
failed to submit evidence demonstrating that his case was prejudiced by it. Petitioner did not 
show that his counsel's ineffective performance undermined his constitutional right to a fair trial 
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and impartial jury. 
Since Petitioner did not submit facts that support his allegations, Respondent is entitled 
to summary judgment on claims 16(b) and (c). 
Subsection 6. Claim 16(d) 
In claim 16(d), Petitioner argues that trial counsel failed to adequately "brief and raise all 
of the issues regarding holding the trial in the Central Utah Correctional Facility, including 
obtaining data from experts on the effect of the prison location upon jurors, witnesses, and 
[Petitioner's] right to a public trial." Amended Petition at 16-17. Petitioner furnishes no facts 
indicating what type of evidence trial counsel should have obtained and presented to the trial 
court or what specific expert testimony would have provided concerning the effect of the prison 
location on jurors and witnesses. 
In his opposing memorandum, Petitioner states that prior counsel has indicated that 
providing the trial court with expert evidence, as well as "other court holdings," would have 
resulted in the trial not being held at the CUCF. 
Again, Petitioner does not submit specific facts to support his claim. Respondent, 
therefore, is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(d). 
Subsection 7. Claim 16(e) 
Claim 16(e) alleges failure of trial counsel "to seek interlocutory review of the adverse 
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ruling on the issue of venue and trial in the prison." Amended Petition at 17. Petitioner supports 
his claim with the recent case of State v. Stubbs, 123 P.3d 407 (Utah 2005). Mem. in Opp. at 38. 
In Stubbs, the Utah Supreme Court encouraged defendants to bring up questions of venue on 
interlocutory appeal prior to going to trial3. At 410, [^10, n.3. 
Even in light of the Stubbs decision, Petitioner still has to satisfy the Strickland standard. 
Strickland mandates "that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to 
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from 
counsel's perspective at the time." At 689. Applying the Supreme Court's dictum in Stubbs to 
evaluate trial counsel's performance in Petitioner's case would be doing precisely what 
Strickland instructs should not be done, namely, relying on hindsight. 
Petitioner provides no additional evidence or argument demonstrating that his trial 
counsel was ineffective in choosing not to seek interlocutory review of the denial of the motion 
to change venue. Thus, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(e). 
Subsection 8. Claims 16(f) and (g) 
In claim 16(f), Petitioner asserts that "trial counsel failed to adequately brief and research 
pretrial motions which were filed." Amended Petition at 17. Claim 16(g) alleges that "trial 
3
 The precise language from Stubbs is, "[although most cases have been presented to us following a 
conviction, we encourage the defendants to raise venue questions on interlocutory appeal. This both ensures fairness at 
trial and discourages the defendants from abusing the appeals process by waiting until the trial is over to resolve this 
issue." At 410, If] 0, n3. 
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counsel failed to file pretrial motions to prevent the introduction of improper evidence." Id. 
Petitioner says that under Rule 65C(c)(3) he is only required to state in concise terms the 
facts that form the basis of his claim; and he is not obligated to support his claims with evidence 
or affidavits. See Mem. in Opp. at 19. He further says that "[c]ounsel has again shown that 
pretrial motions were either not done correctly, or were completely skipped ... [and that this] 
sufficiently [lays] the issue out with enough particularity to pass summary judgment and 
dismissal." Id. at 43. 
Petitioner does not tell the Court which pre-trial motions were inadequately briefed. He 
also does not explain what evidence should have been the subject of a motion to suppress. 
Petitioner's claims are again not properly supported with facts as required by Rules 
65C(d)(l) and 56(e). Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claims 16(f) and 
(g). 
Subsection 9. Claim 16(h) 
In claim 16(h), Petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
sufficiently investigate, interview, or secure potential witnesses. Petitioner says that the 
testimony of those witnesses would show that there were no effective procedures in prison to 
handle inmate threats. 
Claim 16(h) also alleges failure of counsel to secure the "jackets" of the State's 
witnesses, which could have revealed potential credibility issues, and to obtain racist statements 
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that were allegedly overheard by fellow inmates. In response to the State, Petitioner says that he 
"has sufficiently claimed the facts with enough particularity that evidence should be taken. This 
allegation is sufficient to pass summary judgment and dismissal." Mem. in Opp. at 44. 
The State argued at the trial that there were procedures in prison for addressing inmate 
threats. Petitioner identifies three potential witnesses whom trial counsel should have 
interviewed and whose testimony could have rebutted that argument. 
Even if the trial counsel's performance was objectively unreasonable here, Petitioner has 
not provided any evidence demonstrating prejudice. 
Petitioner also fails to support the rest of claim 16(h) with specific facts. He does not 
identify the two black witnesses who knew the Petitioner and could have rebutted the "racist 
claim." He does not tell what testimony they would have provided. He also does not specify 
what potential impeachment evidence would have been discovered if the trial counsel secured 
the "jackets" of the State's witnesses. 
In its motion for summary judgment, Respondent "identified] the portions of the 
pleadings or supporting documents which it believes demonstrates an absence of a genuine issue 
of material fact." TS 1 Partnership at 158. Petitioner was required under Rule 56(e) to respond 
with specific facts. Petitioner did not do it. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary 
judgment on claim 16(h). 
Subsection 10. Claim 16(1) 
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Here, Petitioner claims trial counsel failed to warn him about the dangers of engaging in 
conversations with custodial officers or other persons outside of counsel's presence. See 
Amended Petition at 17. Petitioner does not describe any specific conversations of that nature. 
Respondent refers to a specific incident where Petitioner commented to the guards just prior to 
being escorted into the courtroom on the day he made an unsworn statement to jurors during the 
penalty phase. The guards testified they heard Petitioner say he was going to feign remorse. 
Petitioner argues that under the state and federal constitutions, trial counsel had a duty to 
warn him about the "adversary nature of the proceedings/' Mem. in Opp. at 45. The State replies 
that Petitioner does not specify the information of which his trial counsel should have been 
aware and which should have triggered a duty to warn. Mem. in Supp. at 78. 
Even if trial counsel was ineffective in failing to warn, Petitioner did not demonstrate 
prejudice. Petitioner did not show that the jury's verdict would have probably been different if 
the guards did not testify about Petitioner's comments. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to 
summary judgment on claim 16(i). 
Subsection 11. Claim 16(j) 
In claim 16(j), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
"adequately review and make objection to the improper original transfer of [Petitioner] under the 
Interstate Compact Agreement." Amended Petition at 17-18. Petitioner says that the illegal 
transfer resulted in a due process violation because prison staff purposely placed him in a "kill 
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or be killed" situation that required him to defend himself by taking another person's life. 
Petitioner's due process argument rests upon his self-defense claim. This claim was 
litigated in Petitioner's direct appeal and rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. See Kell at 1028-
29,1Hf22-25. Therefore, the Petitioner did not show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's 
failure to raise this due process issue. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 
16Q. 
Subsection 12. Claim 16(k) 
^ Claim 16(k) alleges trial counsel failed to properly investigate and illustrate prosecutorial 
misconduct relating to the testimony of Francisco Colon, one of the prosecution's key witnesses 
against Petitioner at trial. Petitioner argues that Francisco Colon perjured himself at trial. 
Respondent replies that Petitioner "alleges insufficient facts to show that Colon perjured 
himself, that the prosecutor knew this, or that there is any reasonable likelihood that the perjured 
testimony could have affected the outcome." Mem. in Supp. at 80. 
Petitioner denies the facts raised in Respondent's memorandum, but again fails to support 
his claim with specific facts. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 
16(k). 
Subsection 13. Claim 16(IVfq) 
In claims 16(l)-(q), Petitioner argues that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 
properly challenge five prospective jurors for cause. This subsequently forced him to expend 
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peremptory challenges in order to have them removed. 
Respondent argues that the record does not demonstrate sufficient bias on the part of 
these prospective jurors "to overcome the presumption that counsel made a legitimate choice not 
to challenge these jurors for cause." Mem. in Supp. at 45. In response, Petitioner denies the 
additional facts presented in Respondent's memorandum and asks for an evidentiary hearing to 
allow him to challenge trial counsel and to show that one or more biased jurors decided his case. 
See Mem. in Opp. at 37. 
The jury selection process is characterized as "highly subjective, judgmental, and 
intuitive." State v. Litherland, 12 P.3d 92, 99, f20 (Utah 2000). Because of the nature of the jury 
selection process, counsel's choice is presumed to be conscious and strategic and to constitute 
effective assistance unless shown otherwise. Id. In order to overcome this presumption, 
Petitioner must show either (1) that failure to remove a juror was not a product of conscious 
choice because counsel was inattentive or indifferent; or (2) that a prospective juror expressed a 
very strong bias; or (3) that there is no plausible justification for counsel's choice. Id. at 100, 
1125. 
Petitioner did not demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of fact with respect to any of 
these factors. 
The facts show that trial counsel was attentive and engaged during the jury selection 
process. He asked specific questions concerning prospective jurors' views on the death penalty, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, Case number 030600171. Page -20-
their ability to be impartial, whether they could avoid drawing any negative inferences about the 
Petitioner if he chose not to testify, and whether they could follow the law as instructed by the 
court. 
Petitioner says that the prospective jurors he identified in his claim were biased. 
However, he did not show that their bias was "strong and unequivocal." Id. 
Finally, Petitioner did not submit any evidence demonstrating that counsel's decision not 
to challenge these jurors was not plausibly justifiable. 
Even if trial counsel was, nevertheless, ineffective, Petitioner again did not produce any 
facts showing prejudice. Absent such a showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that any genuine 
issue exists with respect to trial counsel's effectiveness. See TS1 Partnership at 158. 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on claims 16(l)-(q) is granted. 
Subsection 14. Claim 16(r) 
Here, Petitioner alleges that trial counsel "should have objected to the specific statements 
in the prosecutor's opening that were argumentative and not merely to show the jury what 
evidence would be submitted." Mem. in Opp. at 48. Petitioner does not identify the statements 
and does not show the connection between lack of objection and the outcome of the trial. 
Again Petitioner has failed to submit sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a genuine 
issue of material fact exists concerning trial counsel's effectiveness with respect to the alleged 
prosecutorial misconduct. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 16(r). 
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Subsection 15. Claim 16(s) 
In claim 16(s), Petitioner asserts that "trial counsel failed to adequately advise [him] as to 
whether or not [he] should testify in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial where he would be 
subject to cross-examination." Amended Petition at 20. Petitioner further says that his trial 
counsel "did not specifically help or warn Petitioner about the dangers of testifying in the guilt 
phase. A non-testifying opportunity would have brought a different result." Mem. in Opp. at 49. 
These statements are allegations. In support of these allegations, Petitioner should have 
provided specific facts but he failed to do so. Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on 
claim 16(s). 
Subsection 16. Claim 16(t) 
Claim 16(t) alleges that trial counsel "failed to have bench conferences transcribed to 
preserve the record of the proceedings, even though this was a death penalty case." Amended 
Petition at 20. Petitioner explains that defense attorneys are trained to have all the bench 
conferences in capital cases recorded. Mem. in Opp. at 49. 
Here, again, Petitioner did not show prejudice by specific facts. It is not clear how 
recordings of the bench conferences would have produced a different outcome for the Petitioner. 
Without this showing, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that there is a genuine issues with respect to 
trial counsel's ineffective assistance. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on 
claim 16(t). 
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V. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel at the Penalty Phase 
Subsection 1. Claim 17(a) 
In claim 17(a), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to 
the improper opening statement of the prosecutor. Petitioner also states that trial "counsel should 
have objected to the specific statements in the prosecutor's opening that were argumentative and 
not merely to show the jury what evidence would be submitted." Mem. in Opp. at 48. 
Petitioner does not identify the argumentative statements and does not show how 
counsel's objection would have affected the outcome of the trial. Petitioner did not present 
sufficient evidence to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Respondent is 
entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(a). 
Subsection 2. Claim 17(b) 
Petitioner argues in claim 17(b) that trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to "make 
an opening statement informing the jury of [Petitioner's] position." Amended Petition at 21. 
Respondent has not requested summary judgment on this claim; perhaps this was an oversight. In 
any event, Petitioner's response is silent as to this claim. 
However, Petitioner did not show that the outcome of the penalty phase would have 
probably been different if his counsel made a more effective opening statement. On this ground, 
Respondent would be entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(b). 
Subsection 3. Claim 17(c) 
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Claim 17(c) alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in failure to "object to the 
presentation of highly prejudicial victim impact testimony." Id. Petitioner argues that because the 
state of the law is always in flux, objections should routinely be made in order to preserve 
defendant's rights. 
Even if trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the victim impact evidence, 
Petitioner has not shown that the outcome of the penalty phase would have been different but for 
trial counsel's alleged deficiency4. Because Petitioner has not shown prejudice, Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Judgment on claim 17(c) is granted. 
Subsection 4. Claim 17(d) 
In claim 17(d), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel was ineffective in "presenting] 
witnesses who were detrimental to [Petitioner] and who gave aggravation evidence rather than 
mitigation evidence." Amended Petition at 21. Petitioner further states that trial counsel "should 
have had sufficient understanding and knowledge of what his witnesses would testify to in the 
penalty phase part of the trial, and not put on evidence that is harmful to his client." Mem. in 
Opp. at 50-51. 
Petitioner does not identify these witnesses nor the parts of their testimony that were 
4
 Petitioner also cannot prove prejudice. On direct appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that "the victim impact 
evidence in this case was moderate in tone, descriptive of the family's loss and mourning but not militant or angry, and 
contained no effort to pressure the jury to impose the death penalty. Absent its presence in the penalty phase, we see no 
possibility that the jury's verdict would have been different, based as it clearly was on the acts and character of the 
defendant." Kell at 1036,1(54. 
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aggravating. He only makes an unsupported allegation of ineffectiveness. Therefore, Respondent 
is entitled to summary judgment on claim 17(d). 
Subsection 5. Claim 17(e) 
In claim 17(e), Petitioner asserts that trial counsel failed to "object to improper closing 
arguments from the prosecution." Amended Petition at 21. Petitioner argues that prosecutorial 
misconduct should always draw an objection, and that by not objecting his counsel failed to 
preserve an issue for appeal. 
Petitioner does not identify the improper arguments presented by the prosecutor. 
Petitioner also did not demonstrate with reasonable probability how a proper objection would 
have changed the outcome of the penalty phase. Thus, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
as to the prejudicial effect of counsel's errors. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary 
judgment on claim 17(e). 
VI. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
Subsection 1. Standard of Review 
Effective assistance of appellate counsel is a right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment Evitts v. Lucey, 469 US 387, 396 (1985). Ineffectiveness of 
appellate counsel is judged under the same standard as ineffectiveness of trial counsel. See Smith 
v. Robbins, 528 US 259, 285 (2000); Brunei- v. Carver, 920 P.2d 1153, 1157 (Utah 1996). This 
standard requires Petitioner to "first show that his counsel was objectively unreasonable in 
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failing to find arguable issues to appeal." Robbins at 285. If Petitioner "succeeds in such a 
showing, he then has the burden of demonstrating prejudice.'Td. To demonstrate prejudice, 
Petitioner must show "a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's unreasonable failure to 
file a merits brief, he would have prevailed on his appeal." Id. 
Appellate counsel is not required to raise every possible issue on appeal. See Carter v. 
Galetka at 639, |48. Only failure to raise a "dead-bang winner" claim is considered to be 
deficient performance. See Id.; see also Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 392-93, 395 (10th Cir. 1995). 
The Tenth Circuit initially defined a claim as a "dead-bang winner" if it "was obvious 
from the trial record ... and ... would have resulted in a reversal on appeal." Cook at 395 
(emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court, however, did not adopt this language. Rather, the 
Carter Court adopted language from the Banks decision which defined "dead-bang winner" "as 
an 'issue which is obvious from the trial record and one which probably would have resulted in 
reversal on appeal.'" Carter at 640, f48 (emphasis added), citing Banks at 1515 n. 13. 
Therefore, in order for the petitioner to avoid summary judgment on any claims that 
allege ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, he must demonstrate that there is a genuine 
issue of material fact with respect to the following elements. First, appellate counsel's failure to 
raise an issue which was obvious from the trial record. Second, the issue must be one which 
probably would have resulted in reversal on appeal. 
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Subsection 2. Claim 18(a) 
Here, Petitioner argues that the appeal of his conviction and death sentence was affirmed 
"as a result of ineffective counsel." Amended Petition at 21. This general allegation identifies no 
specific issue that his counsel failed to raise and which would have probably resulted in reversal 
on appeal. 
Petitioner's Memorandum in Opposition also contains a general allegation that his 
"conviction and sentence were obtained and his appeal was rejected because of ineffective 
assistance both at the trial and the appellate level." At 52. Because Petitioner has failed to 
identify a specific issue or issues, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 18(a). 
Subsection 3. Claim 18(b) 
In claim 18(b), Petitioner argues that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to 
"adequately brief and raise relevant issues on appeal."Amended Petition at 21. Respondent did 
not request summary judgment on this claim; perhaps this was an oversight. 
However, even if the issues raised in Petitioner's post-conviction petition were obvious 
from the trial record and should have been raised or more adequately briefed on appeal, 
Petitioner fails to address how these issues would have resulted in reversal on appeal. Therefore, 
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on claim 18(b). 
Subsection 4. Claim 18(c) 
Petitioner asserts in claim 18(c) that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing "to raise 
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the issue of the legality of [Petitioner's] transfer from Nevada to Utah." Id. As in claim 16(j), 
Petitioner argues that an illegal transfer violated his due process rights. 
The decision on this claim is the same as on claim 16(j). Petitioner's due process 
argument relies on his self-defense claim, which was rejected by the Utah Supreme Court on 
appeal. See Kell at 1028-29, lfl|22-25. Therefore, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on 
claim 18(c). 
Subsection 5. Claim 18(d) 
In claim 18(d), Petitioner concludes that "[ajbsent the errors and omissions of trial and 
appellate counsel, there is a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been convicted 
of aggravated murder, and a reasonable likelihood that petitioner would not have been sentenced 
to death." Amended Petition at 21. Although this statement is under the heading "Kell's 
Appellate counsel was ineffective" in Petitioner's post-conviction petition, it is clearly not an 
assertion of a claim for relief but a legal conclusion. 
Conclusion 
In his Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Petitioner raises several claims and 
sub-claims of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Petitioner argues that these 
claims demonstrate that his conviction is unconstitutional. Respondent moved for summary 
judgment on all of the Petitioner's claims. After considering all of the issues raised, the Court 
grants Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial Summary Judgment on claims 8, 9, 10, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. Case number 030600171. Page -28-
11, 13(a), 14, 15 (a), 15(b), 16 (a)-(t), that portion of claim 16(e) which alleges ineffectiveness of 
trial counsel in failing to seek interlocutory review of the trial court's decision to try Petitioner at 
the CUCF, claims 17(a)-(e), and 18(a)-(d). 
Order 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and for Partial 
Summary Judgment is granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Petitioner's petition for post-conviction relief is 
dismissed. 
This Ruling and Order constitutes the final order of the Court. No further order is 
necessary to effectuate the Court's decision. Digitaly signed by David L Mower 
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ADDENDUM B 
Amendment 5 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time 
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense 
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation. 
Amendment 6 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the 
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence• 
Amendment 14 
1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, 
excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the 
choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the 
United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, 
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the 
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole 
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove 
such disability. 
4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred 
in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for 
the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and 
claims shall be held illegal and void. 
5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or properly, without due process of law. 
Article I, Section 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person and by 
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify 
in his own behalf, to be confironted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel 
the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the 
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to advance money 
or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the function of that 
examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided by 
statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by 
statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as defined 
by statute or rule. 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory 
judgment may, at any time after the expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a 
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary judgment upon all or any part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory 
judgment is sought, may, at any time, move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The 
judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party 
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or 
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and 
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without 
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. \t shall thereupon make an 
order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of 
damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the 
trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified copies of ail papers or parts thereof 
referred to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be 
supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits. When a motion for summary 
judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party 
failing to file such a response, 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party 
cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or 
discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are presented in bad faith or 
solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused, Including reasonable attorney's fees, and 
any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Rule 65C. Post-conviction relief. 
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-
35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction Remedies Act. 
(b) Commencement and venue. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the district 
court in the county in which the judgment of conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by 
the court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is filed in the wrong county. The 
court may order a change of venue on motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
(c) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of the 
cpnyiction or sentence. Additional claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in 
Subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state: 
(c)(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration; 
(c)(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which 
the conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(c)(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's claim to relief: 
(c)(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for violation of probation has been 
reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the 
results of the appeal; 
(c)(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil 
proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results 
of the prior proceeding: and 
(c)(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence, the reasons why the evidence 
could not have been discovered in time for the claim to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-
conviction petition. 
(d) Attachments to the petition, if available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall attach to the petition: 
(d)(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations; 
(d)(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the direct appeal of the petitioner's 
case; 
(d)(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence; and 
(d)(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court. 
(e) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the 
petition, but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition. 
(f) Assignment. On the fiiing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and deliver it to the judge who sentenced 
the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal 
course. 
(g)(1) Summary dismissal of claims. The assigned judge s hail review the petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that 
any claim has been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the 
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the claim has been adjudicated or that the 
claim is frivolous on its face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate 
with the entry of tne order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings of fact or conclusions of law. 
(g)(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations contained in the pleadings and 
attachments, it appears that 
(g)(2)(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law, 
(g)(2)(B) the claims nave no arguable basis in fact, or 
(g)(2)(Cj the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior to the filing of the petition 
(g)(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error or failure to comply with the 
requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days The court may 
grant one additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown 
(g)(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction petition tn a case where the petitioner 
is sentenced to death 
(h) Service of petit ons If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all or part of the petition should not be 
summarily dismissed, the court shall designate the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to 
serve a copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent If the petition is a challenge 
to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is the staie of Utah represented by the Attornev General in all other 
cases, the respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner 
(i) Answer or other response Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a 
copy of the petition upon the respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the respondent 
shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition tnat have not been dismissed and shall serve the 
answer or other response upon the petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b) Within 30 days (plus time allowed for 
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by 
memorandum to the motion No further pleadings or amendments will be permitted unless ordered oy the court 
0) Hearings After pieadmgs are closed the court shall promptly set the proceeding for a heanng or otherwise dispose 
of the case The court may also order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay 
unreasonably the ^earing on the merits of the petition At the prehearing conference, the court may 
(j)(1) consider the foimation and simplification of issues, 
0X2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents, and 
0)(3) require tne parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be presented at the evidentiary hearing 
(k) Presence of the petitioner at hearings The petitioner shall be present at the prehearing conference if the petitioner 
is not represented oy counsel The prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video 
conferencing The oetitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need not otherwise 
be present in court during the proceeding The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where the 
petitioner is confired 
(I) Discoven/ recoras Dtscovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed by the court upon motion of a party and a 
determination that there is good cause to believe that discovery is necessary to provide a partv with evidence that is 
likely to be admissiDle at an evidentiary hearing The court may order either the petitioner or the respondent to obtain 
any relevant transcript or court records 
(m) Orders stay 
(m)(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall entei findings of fact and conclusions of law and 
an appropriate order If the petitioner is serving a sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days 
Within the stay period the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner that the respondent will 
pursue a new tna pursue a new sentence, appeal the order or take no action Thereafter the stay of the order is 
governed by these ruies and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure 
(m)(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be taken, the stay shall expire and the 
court shail deliver forthwith to the custodian of the petitioner the order to release the petitioner. 
(m)(3) if the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced, the trial court may enter any 
supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial, sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters thai may be 
necessary and proper. 
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems 
appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that 
prosecuted the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections, Section 64-13-23 and 
sections 78-7-36 through 78-7-43 govern the manner and procedure by which the trial court shall determine the 
amount, if any, to charge for fees and costs. 
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of 
Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts. 
ADDENDUM C 
American Bar Association 
Guidelines for the 
Appointment and 
Performance of Counsel 
In Death Penalty Cases 
1989 
(Note: This version has been superceded by a February, 2003 revision) 
INTRODUCTION 
At its 1989 Midyear Meeting, the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted 
Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, These 
Guidelines amplify previously adopted Association positions on effective assistance of counsel 
in capital cases and the need for adequate compensation and support and provide a concrete 
procedure for the appointment of attorneys with appropriate experience and training to represent 
defendants in capital cases. In addition, they enumerate the minimal resources and practices 
necessary to provide effective assistance of counsel. 
Some national standards have been written for appointment of counsel for eligible defendants 
generally; general standards for defense counsel have been established; and specific Performance 
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation exist in draft form. While some local standards 
may exist for capital representation, national guidelines on the assignment and performance of 
counsel in capital cases did not exist prior to these Guidelines. 
Experience has demonstrated that capital trials and appeals are extremely specialized and 
demanding and that the appointment of unqualified, inexperienced counsel can be very costly in 
terms of delay and expense. These Guidelines will greatly assist jurisdictions planning for the 
handling of capital cases in a manner that does not clog their courts, while assuring effective 
assistance of counsel. 
Background 
With initial support from the ABA Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants 
(SCLAID), the National Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) developed, over the 
course of several years, Standards for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death 
Penalty Cases. 
In February 1988, NLADA referred the Standards to SCLAID, which reviewed them and 
circulated them to appropriate ABA sections and committees. SCLAID incorporated the only 
substantive concerns expressed (by the Criminal Justice Section) and changed the nomenclature 
to "Guidelines" as more appropriate than "standards." 
The Sections of Criminal Justice and of Litigation joined SCLAID in sponsoring the Guidelines 
for ABA adoption. The Guidelines were approved by the ABA's House of Delegates without 
change; however, the accompanying resolution recommending adoption by entities providing 
counsel in death penalty cases was amended to allow for such exceptions to the Guidelines as 
may be appropriate in the military. 
Guidelines 
The Guidelines address eligibility, training, support services, trial preparation, the sentencing 
phase and appeals. Each black letter guideline is explained by a commentary, with reference to 
supporting authorities. "Should" is used throughout as a mandatory term and refers to activities 
which are minimum requirements. 
GUIDELINE 1.1 OBJECTIVE 
The objective in providing counsel in cases in which the death penalty is sought should be to 
ensure that quality legal representation is afforded to defendants eligible for the appointment of 
counsel during all stages of the case. 
GUIDELINE 2.1 NUMBER OF ATTORNEYS PER CASE 
In cases where the death penalty is sought, two qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to 
represent the defendant. In cases where the death penalty has been imposed, two qualified 
appellate attorneys should be assigned to represent the defendant. In cases where appellate 
proceedings have been completed or are not available and the death penalty has been imposed, 
two qualified postconviction attorneys should be assigned to represent the defendant. 
GUIDELINE 3.1 THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION PLAN 
The legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should include: measures to formalize the 
process by which attorneys are assigned to represent capital defendants. To accomplish this goal, 
the plan should designate a body (appointing authority) within the jurisdiction which will be 
responsible for performing all duties in connection with the appointment of counsel as set forth 
by these Guidelines. This Guideline envisions two equally acceptable approaches for 
formalizing the process of appointment: 
a. The authority to recruit and select competent attorneys to provide representation in 
capital cases may be centralized in the defender office or assigned counsel program of 
the jurisdiction. The defender office or assigned counsel program should adopt 
standards and procedures for the appointment of counsel in capital cases consistent 
with these Guidelines, and perform all duties in connection with the appointment 
process as set forth in these Guidelines. 
b. In jurisdictions where it is not feasible to centralize the tasks of recruiting and 
selecting competent counsel for capital cases in a defender office or assigned counsel 
program, the legal representation plan should provide for a special appointments 
committee to consist of no fewer than five attorneys who: 
i. are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction; 
ii. have practiced law in the field of criminal defense for not less than five years; 
iii. have demonstrated knowledge of the specialized nature of practice involved in 
capital cases; 
iv. are knowledgeable about criminal defense practitioners in the jurisdiction; and 
v. are dedicated to quality legal representation in capital cases. 
The committee should adopt standards and procedures for the appointment of counsel in capital 
cases, consistent with these Guidelines, and perform all duties in connection with the 
appointment process. 
GUIDELINE 4.1 SELECTION OF COUNSEL 
A. The legal representation plan should provide for a systematic and publicized method for 
distributing assignments in capital cases as widely as possible among qualified members of 
the bar. 
B. The appointing authority should develop procedures to be used in establishing two rosters 
of attorneys who are competent and available to represent indigent capital defendants. The 
first roster should contain the names of attorneys eligible for appointment as lead defense 
counsel for trial, appeal or postconviction pursuant to the qualification requirements 
specified in Guideline 5.1; the second roster should contain the names of attorneys eligible 
for appointment as assistant defense counsel for trial, appeal or postconviction pursuant to 
the qualification requirements specified in the same Guideline. 
C. The appointing authority should review applications from attorneys concerning their 
placement on the roster of eligible attorneys from which assignments are made, as 
discussed in subsection (b). The review of an application should include a thorough 
investigation of the attorney's background, experience, and training, and an assessment of 
whether the attorney is competent to provide quality legal representation to the client 
pursuant to the qualification requirements specified in Guideline 5.1 
and the performance standards established pursuant to Guidelines 11.1 and 1L2. An 
attorney's name should be placed on either roster upon a majority vote of the committee. 
D. Assignments should then be made in the sequence that the names appear on the roster of 
eligible attorneys. Departures from the practice of strict rotation of assignments may be 
made when such departure will protect the best interests of the client. A lawyer should 
never be assigned for reasons personal to the committee members making assignments. 
In jurisdictions where a defender office or other entity by law receives a specific portion of or all 
assignments, the procedures in (b) through (d) above should be followed for cases which the 
defender office or other entity cannot accept due to conflicts of interest or other reasons. 
GUIDELINE 5.1 ATTORNEY ELIGIBILITY 
The appointing authority should distribute assignments to attorneys who qualify under either of 
the alternative procedures detailed below in paragraphs I. TRIAL; II. APPEAL; and III. 
POSTCONVICTION. 
1. TRIAL 
A. Lead trial counsel assignments should be distributed to attorneys who: 
i. are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or admitted to 
practice pro hac vice; and 
ii. are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least five years litigation 
experience in the field of criminal defense; and 
iiL have prior experience as lead counsel in no fewer than nine jury trials of serious and 
complex cases which were tried to completion, as well as prior experience as lead 
counsel or co-counsel in at least one case in which the death penalty was sought. In 
addition, of the nine jury trials which were tried to completion, the attorney should 
have been lead counsel in at least three cases in which the charge was murder or 
aggravated murder; or alternatively, of the nine jury trials, at least one was a murder 
or aggravated murder trial and an additional five were felony jury trials; and 
iv. are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal courts of the 
jurisdiction; and 
v. are familiar with and experienced in the utilization of expert witnesses and evidence, 
including, but not limited to, psychiatric and forensic evidence; and 
vi. have attended and successfully completed, within one year of their appointment, a 
training or educational program on criminal advocacy which focused on the trial of 
cases in which the death penalty is sought; and 
vii. have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which exemplify the 
quality of representation appropriate to capital cases. 
B. Trial co-counsel assignments should be distributed to attorneys who: 
i. are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or admitted to practice 
pro hac vice: and 
ii. who qualify as lead counsel under paragraph (A) of this Guideline or meet the 
following requirements: 
a. are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least three years litigation 
experience in the field of criminal defense; and 
b. have prior experience as lead counsel or co-counsel in no fewer than three jury 
trials of serious and complex cases which were tried to completion, at least two 
of which were trials in which the charge was murder or aggravated murder; or 
alternatively, of the three jury trials, at least one was a murder or aggravated 
murder trial and one was a felony jury trial; and 
c. are familiar with the practice and procedure of the criminal courts of the 
jurisdiction; and 
d. have completed within one year of their appointment at least one training or 
educational program on criminal advocacy which focused on the trial of cases in 
which the death penalty is sought; and 
e. have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which exemplify 
the quality of representation appropriate to capital cases. 
C. Alternate Procedures: Appointments for lead and co-counsel assignments may also be 
distributed to persons with extensive criminal trial experience or extensive civil litigation 
experience, if it is clearly demonstrated to the appointing authority that competent representation 
will be provided to the capitally charged indigent defendant Lawyers appointed under this 
paragraph shall meet one or more of the following qualifications: 
i. Experience in the trial of death penalty cases which does not meet the levels detailed 
in paragraphs A or B above; 
ii. Specialized post-graduate training in the defense of persons accused of capital crimes; 
iii. The availability of ongoing consultation support from experienced death penalty 
counsel. 
Attorneys appointed under this paragraph should be prescreened by a panel of experienced death 
penalty attorneys (see Guideline 3.1) to ensure that they will provide competent representation. 
II. APPEAL 
A. Lead appellate counsel assignments should be distributed to attorneys who: 
i. are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or admitted to practice 
pro hac vice: and 
ii. are experienced and active trial or appellate practitioners with at least three years 
experience in the field of criminal defense; and 
iii. have prior experience within the last three years as lead counsel or co-counsel in the 
appeal of at least one case where a sentence of death was imposed, as well as prior 
experience within the last three years as lead counsel in the appeal of no fewer than 
three felony convictions in federal or state court, at least one of which was an appeal 
of murder or aggravated murder conviction; or alternatively, have prior experience 
within the last three years as lead counsel in the appeal of no fewer than six felony 
convictions in federal or state court, at least two of which were appeals of a murder or 
aggravated murder conviction; and 
iv. are familiar with the practice and procedure of the appellate courts of the 
jurisdiction; and 
v. have attended and successfully completed, within one year prior to their appointment, 
a training or educational program on criminal advocacy which focused on the appeal 
of cases in which a sentence of death was imposed; and 
vi. have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which exemplify the 
quality of representation appropriate to capital cases. 
B Appellate co-counsel assignments may be distributed to attorneys who have less experience 
than attorneys who qualify as lead appellate counsel. At a minimum, however, appellate 
co-counsel candidates must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the appointing authority that 
they: 
i. are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or admitted to practice 
pro hac vice: and 
ii. have demonstrated adequate proficiency in appellate advocacy in the field of felony 
defense; and 
iii. are familiar with the practice and procedure of the appellate courts of the jurisdiction; 
and 
iv. have attended and successfully completed within two years of their appointment 
training or educational program on criminal appellate advocacy. 
C. Alternate Procedures: Appointments for lead and co-counsel assignments may also be 
distributed to persons with extensive criminal trial and/or appellate experience or extensive 
civil litigation and/or appellate experience, if it is clearly demonstrated to the appointing 
authority that competent representation will be provided to the capitally charged indigent 
defendant. Lawyers appointed under this paragraph shall meet one or more of the following 
qualifications: 
L Experience in the trial and/or appeal of death penalty cases which does not meet the 
levels detailed in paragraphs A or B above; 
ii. Specialized post-graduate training in the defense of persons accused of capital crimes; 
iii. The availability of ongoing consultation support from experienced death penalty 
counsel. 
Attorneys appointed under this paragraph should be prescreened by a panel of experienced death 
penalty attorneys (see Guideline 3.1) to ensure that they will provide competent representation. 
IIL POSTCONVICTION 
Assignments to represent indigents in postconviction proceedings in capital cases should be 
distributed to attorneys who: 
i. are members of the bar admitted to practice in the jurisdiction or admitted to practice 
pro hac vice; and 
ii. are experienced and active trial practitioners with at least three years litigation 
experience in the field of criminal defense; and 
iii. have prior experience as counsel in no fewer than five jury or bench trials of serious 
and complex cases which were tried to completion, as well as prior experience as 
postconviction counsel in at least three cases in state or federal court. In addition, of 
the five jury or bench trials which were tried to completion, the attorney should have 
been counsel in at least three cases in which the charge was murder or aggravated 
murder; or alternatively, of the five trials, at least one was a murder or aggravated 
murder trial and an additional three were felony jury trials; and 
iv. are familiar with the practice and procedure of the appropriate courts of the 
jurisdiction; and 
v. have attended and successfully completed, within one year prior to their appointment, 
a training or educational program on criminal advocacy which focused on the 
postconviction phase of a criminal case, or alternatively, a program which focused on 
the trial of cases in which the death penalty is sought; and 
vi. have demonstrated the necessary proficiency and commitment which exemplify the 
quality of representation appropriate to capital cases. 
In addition to the experience level detailed above, it is desirable that at least one of the two 
postconviction attorneys also possesses appellate experience at the level described in 11JB. above 
(relating to appellate co-counsel). 
B. Alternate Procedures: Appointments for lead and co-counsel assignments may also be 
distributed to persons with extensive criminal trial, appellate and/or postconviction 
experience or extensive civil litigation and/or appellate experience, if it is clearly 
demonstrated to the appointing authority that competent representation will be provided to 
the capitally charged indigent defendant. Lawyers appointed under this paragraph shall 
meet one or more of the following qualifications: 
L Experience in trial, appeal and/or postconviction representation in death penalty cases 
which does not meet the levels detailed in paragraph A above; 
ii. Specialized post-graduate training in the defense of persons accused of capital crimes; 
iii. The availability of ongoing consultation support from experienced death penalty 
counsel 
Attorneys appointed under this paragraph should be prescreened by a panel of experienced death 
penalty attorneys (see Guideline 3.1) to ensure that they will provide competent representation. 
GUIDELINE 6.1 WORKLOAD 
Attorneys accepting appointments pursuant to these Guidelines should provide each client with 
quality representation in accordance with constitutional and professional standards. Capital 
counsel should not accept workloads which, by reason of their excessive size, interfere with the 
rendering of quality representation or lead to the breach of professional obligations. 
GUIDELINE 7.1 MONITORING: REMOVAL 
A. The appointing authority should monitor the performance of assigned counsel to ensure 
that the client is receiving quality representation. Where there is compelling evidence that 
an attorney has inexcusably ignored basic responsibilities of an effective lawyer, resulting 
in prejudice to the client's case, the attorney should not 
receive additional appointments. Where there is compelling evidence that an unalterable 
systemic defect in a defender office has caused a default in the basic responsibilities of an 
effective lawyer, resulting in prejudice to a clients case, the office should not receive 
additional appointments. The appointing authority shall establish a procedure which gives 
written notice to counsel or a defender office whose removal is being sought, and an 
opportunity for counsel or the defender office to respond in writing. 
B. In fulfilling its monitoring function, however, the appointing authority should not attempt 
to interfere with the conduct of particular cases. Representation of an accused establishes 
an inviolable attorney-client relationship. In the context of a particular case, removal of 
counsel from representation should not occur over the objection of the client. 
C. No attorney or defender office should be readmitted to the appointment roster after removal 
under (a) above unless such removal is shown to have been erroneous or it is established by 
clear and convincing evidence that the cause of the failure to meet basic responsibilities has 
been identified and corrected. 
GUIDELINE 8.1 SUPPORTING SERVICES 
The legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should provide counsel appointed pursuant to 
these Guidelines with investigative, expert, and other services necessary to prepare and present 
an adequate defense. These should include not only those services and facilities needed for an 
effective defense at trial, but also those that are required for effective defense representation at 
every stage of the proceedings, including the sentencing phase. 
GUIDELINE 9.1 TRAINING 
Attorneys seeking eligibility to receive appointments pursuant to these Guidelines should have 
completed the training requirements specified in Guideline 5.1. Attorneys seeking to remain on 
the roster of attorneys from which assignments are made should continue, on a periodic basis, to 
attend and successfully complete training or educational programs which focus on advocacy in 
death penalty cases. The legal representation plan for each jurisdiction should include sufficient 
funding to enable adequate and frequent training programs to be conducted for counsel in capital 
cases and counsel who wish to be placed on the roster. 
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GUIDELINE 10.1 COMPENSATION 
A. Capital counsel should be compensated for actual time and service performed. The 
objective should be to provide a reasonable rate of hourly compensation which is 
commensurate with the provision of effective assistance of counsel and which reflects the 
extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty litigation. 
B. Capital counsel should also be fully reimbursed for reasonable incidental expenses. 
C. Periodic billing and payment during the course of counsel's representation should be 
provided for in the representation plan. 
GUIDELINE 11.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF PERFORMANCE STANDARDS 
A. The appointing authority should establish standards of performance for counsel appointed 
in death penalty cases. 
B. The standards of performance should include, but should not be limited to, the specific 
standards set out in Guidelines 11.3 through 1L9. 
C. The appointing authority should refer to the standards of performance when assessing the 
qualification of attorneys seeking to be placed on the roster from which appointments in 
death penalty cases are to be made (Guideline 4.1) and in monitoring the performance of 
attorneys to determine their continuing eligibility to remain on the roster (Guideline 7.1). 
GUIDELINE 112 MINIMUM STANDARDS NOT SUFFICIENT 
A. Minimum standards that have been promulgated concerning representation of defendants in 
criminal cases generally, and the level of adherence to such standards required for non-
capital cases, should not be adopted as sufficient for death penalty cases. 
B. Counsel in death penalty cases should be required to perform at the level of an attorney 
reasonably skilled in the specialized practice of capital representation, zealously committed 
to the capital case, who has had adequate time and resources for preparation. 
GUIDELINE 113 DETERMINING THAT DEATH PENALTY IS BEING SOUGHT 
Counsel appointed in any case in which the death penalty is a possible punishment should, even 
if the prosecutor has not indicated that the death penalty will be sought, begin preparation for the 
case as one in which the death penalty will be sought while employing strategies to have the case 
designated by the prosecution as a non-capital one. 
GUIDELINE 1L4.1 INVESTIGATION 
A. Counsel should conduct independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase 
and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Both investigations should begin immediately 
upon counsel's entry into the case and should be pursued expeditiously. 
B. The investigation for preparation of the guilt/innocence phase of the trial should be 
conducted regardless of any admission or statement by the client concerning facts 
constituting guilt. 
C. The investigation for preparation of the sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of 
any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered. This investigation 
should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and 
evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor. 
D. Sources of investigative information may include the following: 
1. Charging Documents: 
Copies of all charging documents in the case should be obtained and examined in the 
context of the applicable statues and precedents, to identify (inter alia): 
A. the elements of the charged offense(s), including the element(s) alleged to make the death 
penalty applicable; 
B. the defenses, ordinary and affiimative, that may be available to the substantive charge and 
to the applicability of the death penalty; 
C. any issues, constitutional or otherwise, (such as statutes of limitations or double Jeopardy) 
which can be raised to attack the charging documents. 
2. The Accused: 
An interview of the client should be conducted within 24 hours of counsel's entry into the 
case, unless there is a good reason for counsel to postpone this interview. In that event, the 
interview should be conducted as soon as possible after counsel's appointment. As soon as 
is appropriate, counsel should cover A-E below (if this is not possible during the initial 
interview, these steps should be accomplished as soon as possible thereafter): 
A. seek information concerning the incident or events giving rise to the charge(s), and any 
improper police investigative practice or prosecutorial conduct which affects the client's 
rights; 
B. explore the existence of other potential sources of information relating to the offense, the 
client's mental state, and the presence or absence of any aggravating factors under the 
applicable death penalty statute and any mitigating factors; 
C. Collect information relevant to the sentencing phase of trial including, but not limited to: 
medical history, (mental and physical illness or injury of alcohol and drug use, birth trauma 
and developmental delays); educational history (achievement, performance and behavior) 
special educational needs including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities); military 
history (type and length of service, conduct, special training); employment and training 
history (including skills and performance, and barriers to employability); family and social 
history (including physical, sexual or emotional abuse); prior adult and Juvenile record; 
prior correctional experience (including conduct or supervision and in the 
institution/education or training/clinical services); and religious and cultural influences. 
D. seek necessary releases for securing confidential records relating to any of the relevant 
histories. 
E. Obtain names of collateral persons or sources to verify, corroborate, explain and expand 
upon information obtained in (c) above. 
3. Potential Witnesses: 
Counsel should consider interviewing potential witnesses, including: 
A. eyewitnesses or other witnesses having purported knowledge of events surrounding the 
offense itself; 
B. witnesses familiar with aspects of the client's life history that might affect the likelihood 
that the client committed the charged offense(s), possible mitigating reasons for the 
offense(s), and/or other mitigating evidence to show why the client should not be sentenced 
to death; 
C. members of the victim's family opposed to having the client killed. Counsel should attempt 
to conduct interviews of potential witnesses in the presence of a third person who will be 
available, if necessary, to testify as a defense witness at trial. Alternatively, counsel should 
have an investigator or mitigation specialist conduct the interviews. 
4. The Police and Prosecution: 
Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution or 
law enforcement authorities, including police reports. Where necessary, counsel should 
pursue such efforts through formal and informal discovery unless a sound tactical reason 
exists for not doing so. 
5. Physical Evidence: 
Where appropriate, counsel should make a prompt request to the police or investigative 
agency for any physical evidence or expert reports relevant to the offense or sentencing. 
6. The Scene: 
Where appropriate, counsel should attempt to view the scene of the alleged offense. This 
should be done under circumstances as similar as possible to those existing at the time of 
the alleged incident (e.g. weather, time of day, and lighting conditions). 
7. Expert Assistance: 
Counsel should secure the assistance of experts where it is necessary or appropriate for: 
A. preparation of the defense; 
B. adequate understanding of the prosecution's case; 
C. rebuttal of any portion of the prosecution's case at the guilt/innocence phase or the 
sentencing phase of the trial; 
D. presentation of mitigation. Experts assisting in investigation and other preparation of the 
defense should be independent and their work product should be confidential to the extent 
allowed by law. Counsel and support staff should use all available avenues including 
signed releases, subpoenas, and Freedom of Information Acts, to obtain all necessary 
information. 
GUIDELINE 11.4.2 CLIENT CONTACT 
Trial counsel should maintain close contact with the client throughout preparation of the case, 
discussing (inter alia) the investigation, potential legal issues that exist or develop, and the 
development of a defense theory. 
GUIDELINE 11.5.1 THE DECISION TO FILE PRETRIAL MOTIONS 
A. Counsel should consider filing a pretrial: notion whenever there exists reason lo believe 
that applicable law may entitle the client to relief or that legal and/or policy arguments can 
be made that the law should provide the requested relief. 
B. Counsel should consider all pretrial motions potentially available, and should evaluate 
them in light of title unique circumstances of a capital case, including the potential impact 
of any pretrial motion or ruling on the strategy for the sentencing phase, and the likelihood 
that all available avenues of appellate and postconviction relief will be sought in the event 
of conviction and imposition of a death sentence. Among the issues that counsel should 
consider addressing in a pretrial motion are: 
1. the pretrial custody of the accused; 
2. the constitutionality of the implicated statute or statutes; 
3. the potential defects in the charging process; 
4. the sufficiency of the charging document; 
5. the propriety and prejudice of any joinder of charges or defendants in the charging 
document; 
6. the discovery obligations of the prosecution including disclosure of aggravating factors to 
be used in seeking the death penalty, and any reciprocal discovery obligations of the 
defense; 
7. the suppression of evidence gathered as the result of violations of the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth 
Amendments to the United States Constitution, including: 
a. the fruits of illegal searches or seizures; 
b. involuntary statements or confessions; statements or confessions obtained in violation 
of the accused's right to counsel, or privilege against self-incrimination; 
c. unreliable identification testimony which would give rise to a substantial likelihood 
of irreparable misidentification; 
8- suppression of evidence gathered in violation of any right, duty or privilege arising out of 
state or local law; 
9. access to resources which may be denied to the client because of indigency and which may 
be necessary in the case, including independent and confidential investigative resources, 
jury selection assistance, and expert witnesses concerning not only the charged offense(s) 
and the client's mental condition, but also the criminal justice system itself; 
10. the defendant's right to a speedy trial; 
11. the defendant's right to a continuance in order to adequately prepare his or her case; 
12. matters of evidence or procedure at either the guilt/innocence or penalty phase of trial 
which may be appropriately litigated by means of a pretrial motion in limine, including 
requests for sequestered, individual voir dire as to the death qualification of jurors and any 
challenges to overly restrictive rules or procedures; 
13. matters of trial or courtroom procedure; 
14. change of venue; 
15. abuse of prosecutorial discretion in seeking the death penalty; 
16. challenges to the process of establishing the jury venire. 
GUIDELINE 11.6.1 THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS 
A. Counsel should explore with the client the possibility and desirability of reaching a 
negotiated disposition of the charges rather than proceeding to a trial. In so doing, counsel 
should fully explain the rights that would be waived by a decision to enter a plea instead of 
proceeding to trial, and should explain the legal and/or factual considerations that bear on 
the potential results of going to trial. 
B. Counsel should ordinarily obtain the consent of the client before entering into any plea 
negotiations. 
C. Counsel should keep the client fully informed of any continued plea discussion or 
negotiations, convey to the client any offers made by the prosecution for a negotiated 
settlement and discuss with the client possible strategies for obtaining an offer from the 
prosecution. 
D. Counsel should not accept any plea agreement without the client's express authorization. 
E. The existence of ongoing plea negotiations with the prosecution does not relieve counsel of 
the obligation to take steps necessary to prepare a defense. If a negotiated disposition 
would be in the best interest of the client, initial refusals by the prosecutor to negotiate 
should not prevent counsel from making further efforts to negotiate. 
GUIDELINE 11.6,2 THE CONTENTS OF PLEA NEGOTIATIONS 
A. In order co develop an overall negotiation plan, counsel should be folly aware of and make 
sure the client is folly aware of: 
1. the maximum penalty that may be imposed for the charged offense(s) and any 
possible lesser included offenses; 
2. where applicable, any collateral consequences of potential penalties less than death, 
such as forfeiture of assets, deportation and civil liabilities, as well as direct 
consequences of potential penalties less than death, such as the possibility and 
likelihood of parole, place of confinement and good-time credits; 
3. the general range of sentences for similar offenses committed by defendants with 
similar backgrounds, and the impact of any applicable sentencing guidelines or 
mandatory sentencing requirements. 
B. In developing a negotiation strategy, counsel should be completely familiar with, inter alia: 
L concessions that the client might offer, such as: 
a. an agreement not to proceed to trial on the merits of the charges; 
b. an agreement not to assert or further litigate particular legal issues; 
c. an agreement to provide the prosecution with assistance in investigating or 
prosecuting the present case or other alleged criminal activity; 
d. an agreement to engage in or refrain from any other conduct, appropriate to the 
case. 
2. benefits the client might obtain from a negotiated settlement, including inter alia: 
a. a guarantee that the death penalty will not be imposed; 
b. an agreement that the defendant will receive, with the assent of the court, a 
specified sentence; 
c. an agreement that, the prosecutor will not advocate a certain sentence, will 
not present certain information to the court, or will engage in or refrain from engaging in other 
actions with regard to sentencing; 
d. an agreement that one or more of multiple charges will be reduced or dismissed; 
e. an agreement that the client will not be subject to further investigation or 
prosecution for uncharged alleged or suspected criminal conduct; 
f. an agreement that the client may enter a conditional plea to preserve the right to 
further contest certain issues affecting the validity of the conviction. 
C. In conducting plea negotiations, counsel should be familiar with: 
1. the types of pleas that may be agreed to, such as a plea of guilty, a conditional plea of 
guilty, or a plea of nolo contendre or other plea which does not require the client to 
personally acknowledge guilt; 
2. the advantages and disadvantages of each available plea according to the 
circumstances of the case; 
3. whether a plea agreement can be made binding on the court and on penal/parole 
authorities. 
D. In conducting plea negotiations, counsel should attempt to become familiar with the 
practice and policies of the particular jurisdiction, the judge and prosecuting authority, the 
family of the alleged victim and any other persons or entities which may affect the content 
and likely results of plea negotiations. 
GUIDELINE 11.6.3 THE DECISION TO ENTER A PLEA OF GUILTY 
A. Counsel should inform the client of any tentative negotiated agreement reached with the 
prosecution, and explain to the client the full content of the agreement along with the 
advantages, disadvantages and potential consequences of the agreement 
B. The decision to enter or to not enter a plea of guilty should be based solely on the client's 
best interest. 
GUIDELINE 11.6.4 ENTRY OF THE PLEA BEFORE THE COURT 
A. Prior to the entry of the plea, counsel should: 
1. make certain that the client understands the rights he or she will waive by entering the 
plea and that the client's decision to waive those rights is knowing, voluntary and 
intelligent; 
2. make certain that the client fully and completely understands the conditions and limits 
of the plea agreement and the maximum punishment, sanctions and other 
consequences the accused will be exposed to by entering a plea; 
3. explain to the client the nature of the plea hearing and prepare the client for the role 
he or she will play in the hearing, including answering questions from the judge and 
providing a statement concerning the offense. 
B. During entry of the plea, counsel should make sure that the full content and conditions of 
the plea agreement are placed on the record before the court 
GUIDELINE 11.7.1 GENERAL TRIAL PREPARATION 
A. As the investigations mandated by Guideline 11A1 produce information, counsel should 
formulate a defense theory. In doing so, counsel should consider both the guilt/innocence 
phase and the penalty phase, and seek a theory that will be effective through both phases. 
B. If inconsistencies between guilt/innocence and penalty phase defenses arise, counsel should 
seek to minimize them by procedural or substantive tactics. 
GUIDELINE 1 L7.2 VOIR DIRE AND JURY SELECTION 
A. Counsel should consider, along with potential legal challenges to the procedures for 
selecting the jury that would be available in any criminal case, whether any procedures 
have been instituted for selection of juries in capital cases that present potential legal bases 
for challenge. 
B. Counsel should be familiar with the precedents relating to questioning and challenging of 
potential jurors, including the procedures surrounding Hdeath qualification" concerning any 
potential juror's beliefs about the death penalty. Counsel should be familiar with 
techniques for rehabilitating potential jurors whose initial indications of opposition to the 
death penalty make them possibly excludable. 
GUIDELINE 11.7.3 OBJECTION TO ERROR AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR 
POST JUDGMENT REVIEW 
Counsel should consider, when deciding whether to object to legal error and whether to assert on 
the record a position regarding any procedure or ruling, that post judgment review in the event of 
conviction and sentence is likely, and counsel should take steps where appropriate to preserve, 
on all applicable state and Federal grounds, any given question for review. 
GUIDELINE 11.8.1 OBLIGATION OF COUNSEL AT THE SENTENCING PHASE OF 
DEATH PENALTY CASES 
Counsel should be aware that the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial is constitutionally 
different from sentencing proceedings in other criminal cases. 
GUIDELINE 11.82 DUTIES OF COUNSEL REGARDING SENTENCING 
OPTIONS. CONSEQUENCES AND PROCEDURES 
A. Counsel should be familiar with the procedures for capital sentencing in the given 
jurisdiction, with the prosecutor's practice in preparing for and presenting the prosecution's 
case at the sentencing phase, and with the case law and rules regarding what information 
may be presented to the sentencing entity or entities, and how that information may be 
presented. Counsel should insist that the prosecutor adhere to the applicable evidentiary 
rules unless a valid strategic reason exists for counsel not to insist. 
B. If the client has chosen not to proceed to trial and a plea of guilty or its equivalent has been 
negotiated and entered by counsel in accordance with Guidelines 11.6.1 through 11.6.4, 
counsel should seek to ensure compliance with all portions of the plea agreement beneficial 
to the client. 
C. Counsel should seek to ensure that the client is not harmed by improper, inaccurate or 
misleading information being considered by the sentencing entity or entities in determining the 
sentence to be imposed. 
D. Counsel should ensure that all reasonably available mitigating and favorable information 
consistent with the defense sentencing theory is presented to the sentencing entity or 
entities in the most effective possible way. 
GUIDELINE 11.8.3 PREPARATION FOR THE SENTENCING PHASE 
A. As set out in Guideline 11.4.1, preparation for the sentencing phase, in the form of 
investigation, should begin immediately upon counsel's entry into the case. Counsel 
should seek information to present to the sentencing entity or entities in mitigation or 
explanation of the offense and to rebut the prosecution's sentencing case. 
B. Counsel should discuss with the client early in the case the sentencing alternatives 
available, and the relationship between strategy for the sentencing phase and for the 
guilt/innocence phase. 
C. Prior to the sentencing phase, counsel should discuss with the client the specific sentencing 
phase procedures of the jurisdiction and advise the client of steps being taken in 
preparation for sentencing. Counsel should discuss with the client the accuracy of any 
information known to counsel that will he presented to the sentencing entity or entities, and 
the strategy for meeting the prosecution's case. 
D. If the client will be interviewed by anyone other than people working with defense counsel, 
counsel should prepare the client for such interview(s). Counsel should discuss with the 
client the possible impact on the sentence and later potential proceedings (such as appeal, 
subsequent retrial or resentencing) of statements the client may give in the interviews. 
E. Counsel should consider, and discuss with the client, the possible consequences of having 
the client testify or make a statement to the sentencing entity or entities. 
F. In deciding which witnesses and evidence to prepare for presentation at the sentencing 
phase, counsel should consider the following: 
1. Witnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the client's life and development, 
from birth to the time of sentencing, who would be favorable to the client, explicative of the 
offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced, or would contravene evidence presented by the 
prosecutor; 
2. Expert witnesses to provide medical, psychological, sociological or other 
explanations for the offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced, to give a 
favorable opinion as to the client's capacity for rehabilitation, etc. and/or to rebut 
expert testimony presented by the prosecutor; 
3. Witnesses with knowledge and opinions about the lack of effectiveness of the death 
penalty itself; 
4. Witnesses drawn from the victim's family or intimates who are willing to speak 
against killing the client 
GUIDELINE 11.8.4 THE OFFICIAL PRESENTENCE REPORT 
A. If an official presentence report or similar document may or will be presented to the court 
at any time, counsel should consider: 
1. The strategic implications of requesting that an optional report be prepared; 
2, The value of providing to the report preparer information favorable to the client. 
B. Counsel should review any completed report and take appropriate steps to ensure that 
improper, incorrect or misleading information that may harm the client is deleted from the 
report. 
C. Counsel should take steps to preserve and protect the client's interest regarding material 
that has been challenged by the defense as improper, inaccurate or misleading. 
D. Counsel should consider whether the client should speak with the person preparing the 
report and, if so, whether counsel should be present. 
GUIDELINE 1 L8.5 THE PROSECUTOR'S CASE AT THE SENTENCING PHASE. 
A. Counsel should attempt to determine at the earliest possible time what aggravating factors 
the prosecution will rely on in seeking the death penalty and what evidence will be offered 
in support thereof (Guideline 11.3). If the Jurisdiction has rules regarding notification of 
these factors, counsel should object to any non-compliance, and if such rules are 
inadequate, should consider challenging the adequacy of the rules. 
B. If counsel determines that the prosecutor plans to rely on or offer arguably improper, 
inaccurate or misleading evidence in support of the request for the death penalty, counsel 
should consider appropriate pretrial or trial strategies in response. 
GUIDELINE 11,8,6 THE DEFENSE CASE AT THE SENTENCING PHASE 
A. Counsel should present to the sentencing entity or entities all reasonably available evidence 
in mitigation unless there are strong strategic reasons to forego some portion of such 
evidence. 
B. Among the topics counsel should consider presenting is: 
1. Medical history (including mental and physical illness or injury, alcohol and drug use, 
birth trauma and developmental delays); 
2. Educational history (including achievement, performance and behavior, special 
educational needs including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities) and 
opportunity or lack thereof; 
3. Military service, (including length and type of service, conduct, and special training); 
4. Employment and training history (including skills and performance, and barriers to 
employability); 
5. Family, and social history (including physical, sexual or emotional abuse, 
neighborhood surroundings and peer influence); and other cultural or religion 
influence, professional intervention (by medical personnel, social workers, law 
enforcement personnel, clergy or others) or lack thereof; prior correctional experience 
(including conduct on supervision and in institutions, education or training, and 
clinical services); 
6- Rehabilitative potential of the client. 
7. Record of prior offenses (adult and juvenile), especially where there is no record, a 
short record, or a record of non-violent offenses. 
8. Expert testimony concerning any of the above and the resulting impact on the client, 
relating to the offense and to the clients potential at the time of sentencing. 
C. Counsel should consider all potential methods for offering mitigating evidence to the 
sentencing entity or entities, including witnesses, affidavits, reports (including, if 
appropriate, a defense presentence report which could include challenges to inaccurate, 
misleading or incomplete information contained in the official presentence report and/or 
offered by the prosecution, as well as information favorable to the client), letters and public 
records. 
D. Counsel may consider having the client testify or speak during the closing argument of the 
sentencing phase. 
GUIDELINE 11.9.1 DUTIES OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN POST JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS 
A. Counsel should he familiar with all state and federal post judgment options available to the 
client. Counsel should consider and discuss with the client the post judgment procedures 
that will or may follow imposition of the death sentence. 
B. Counsel should take whatever action, such as filing a claim or notice of appeal, is necessary 
to preserve the client's right to post judgment review of the conviction and sentence. 
Counsel should consider what other post judgment action, if any, counsel could take to 
maximize the client s opportunity to seek appellate and postconviction relief. 
C. Trial counsel should not cease acting on the client's behalf until subsequent counsel has 
entered the case or trial counsel s representation has been formally terminated. 
D. Trial counsel should cooperate with subsequent counsel concerning information regarding 
trial-level proceedings and strategies. 
A. Appellate counsel should be tamiliar with all state and federal appellate and postconviction 
options available to the client, and should consider how any tactical decision might affect 
later options. 
B. Appellate counsel should interview the client, and trial counsel if possible, about the case, 
including any relevant matters that do not appear in the record. Counsel should consider 
whether any potential off-record matters should have an impact on how the appeal is 
pursued, and whether an investigation of any matter is warranted. 
C. Appellate counsel should communicate with the client concerning both the substance and 
procedural status of the appeal. 
D. Appellate counsel should seek, when perfecting the appeal, to present all arguably 
meritorious issues, including challenges to any overly restrictive appellate rules. 
E. Appellate counsel should cooperate with any subsequent counsel concerning information 
about the appellate proceedings and strategies, and about information obtained by appellate 
counsel concerning earlier stages of the case. 
GUIDELINE 11,9,3 DUTIES OF POSTCONVICTION COUNSEL 
A. Postconviction counsel should he familiar with all state and federal postconviction 
remedies available to the client. 
B. Postconviction counsel should interview the client, and previous counsel if possible, about 
the case. Counsel should consider conducting a foil investigation of the case, relating to 
both the guilt/innocence and sentencing phases. Postconviction counsel should obtain and 
review a complete record of all court proceedings relevant to the case. With the consent of 
the client, postconviction counsel should obtain and review all prior counsels file(s). 
C. Postconviction counsel should seek to present to the appropriate court or courts all arguably 
meritorious issues, including challenges to overly restrictive rules governing postconviction 
proceedings. 
GUIDELINE 11.9.4 DUTIES OF CLEMENCY COUNSEL 
A. Clemency counsel should be familiar wilfa the procedures for and permissible substantive 
content of a request for clemency. 
B. Clemency counsel should interview the client, and any prior attorneys if possible, and 
conduct an investigation to discover information relevant to the clemency procedure 
applicable in the jurisdiction. 
C. Clemency counsel should take appropriate steps to ensure that clemency is sought in as 
timely and persuasive a manner as possible. 
GUIDELINE 11.9 .5 DUTIES COMMON TO ALL POST JUDGMENT COUNSEL 
A. Counsel representing a capital client at any point after imposition of the death sentence 
should he familiar with the procedures by which execution dates are set and how 
notification of that date is made. Counsel should also be familiar with the procedures for 
seeking a stay of execution from all courts in which the case may be lodged when an 
execution date is set. 
B. Counsel should take immediate steps to seek a stay of execution, and to appeal from any 
denial of a stay, in any and all available courts when an execution date is set 
C. Counsel should continually monitor the client's mental, physical and emotional condition 
to determine whether any deterioration in the client's condition warrants legal action. 
